S-32 and Dying Declaration under IEA, 1872

Question: What is Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, and in what cases are statements by persons who are dead or cannot be found relevant under this section?

Answer:

Introduction: Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with the admissibility of statements made by persons who are no longer available to testify. This section outlines specific circumstances under which such statements are considered relevant and admissible in court.

Main Body:

Section 32: Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant

• General Rule: Statements made by a person who is dead, cannot be found, has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without undue delay or expense are relevant facts in certain situations.

Specific Cases under Section 32:

1. Cause of Death:

• Statements made by a person regarding the cause of their death or the circumstances leading to their death are relevant when the cause of their death is in question. These statements are admissible regardless of whether the person expected to die when making them.
• Illustration (a): If A was murdered by B, statements made by A regarding the cause of death are relevant.

2. Statements Made in Course of Business:

• Statements made in the ordinary course of business, such as entries in books, acknowledgments, documents used in commerce, and dates on letters, are relevant.
• Illustration (b): An entry by a deceased surgeon noting he attended A’s mother on the day of A’s birth is relevant.

3. Statements Against Interest:

• Statements against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person making it, or those exposing them to criminal prosecution or a suit for damages, are relevant.
• Illustration (c): A solicitor’s diary entry that he met A in Calcutta on a specific date is relevant.

4. Public Right, Custom, or Matters of General Interest:

• Statements giving opinions on public rights, customs, or matters of public interest made before any controversy arose are relevant.
• Illustration (i): A statement by a deceased village headman that a road is public is relevant.

5. Existence of Relationship:

• Statements about the existence of relationships by blood, marriage, or adoption made by someone with special knowledge before any dispute arose are relevant.
• Illustration (k): A statement by A that B is his son is relevant.

6. Statements in Wills or Deeds Relating to Family Affairs:

• Statements about relationships between deceased persons made in wills, deeds, family pedigrees, tombstones, family portraits, etc., are relevant if made before any dispute arose.
• Illustration (m): An entry in a memorandum book by B’s deceased father about B’s marriage to A on a specific date is relevant.

7. Documents Relating to Transactions in Section 13 Clause (a):

• Statements in documents related to transactions mentioned in Section 13 clause (a) are relevant.

8. Statements by Several Persons Expressing Feelings:

• Statements by multiple persons expressing feelings or impressions relevant to the matter in question are relevant.
• Illustration (n): Remarks by spectators about a caricature in a libel case are relevant.

Conclusion:

Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act ensures that statements made by individuals who cannot testify are still considered in court under specific circumstances. This provision allows for the inclusion of critical evidence that might otherwise be unavailable, ensuring that justice is served even in the absence of the original declarants. The various illustrations highlight the practical application of this section in different scenarios, reinforcing its importance in the legal framework.

Question: What is the meaning and value of substantive evidence, and how does it relate to certain provisions of the Indian Evidence Act?

Answer:

Introduction: Substantive evidence is a crucial concept in legal proceedings, representing the core of the evidence presented in court. This answer explores the definition, value, and specific applications of substantive evidence under various provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.

Main Body:

Meaning of Substantive Evidence:

1. Supreme Court Definition:

• The Supreme Court has defined substantive evidence as the testimony of a witness given in court under oath .

2. Madras High Court Observation:

• In the case of Kannan @ Mannanai Kannan and Ors. v. State, the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court noted that substantive evidence is the evidence provided by witnesses on oath during a criminal trial .

3. Madhya Pradesh High Court Definition:

• In Narayan v. State of M.P., the Madhya Pradesh High Court described substantive evidence as the statement made by a witness in court, highlighting that this is the general rule for considering evidence as substantive .

Value of Substantive Evidence:

— Dying Declarations:

• Justice Syed Shah Quadri, in Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar (1998), stated that a dying declaration is substantive evidence and, like any other substantive evidence, does not require corroboration to form the basis for convicting an accused .

Substantive Evidence and Provisions of the Indian Evidence Act:

Test Identification Parade:

— Supreme Court Decision:

• In Raju Majhi v. State of Bihar (2018), the Supreme Court ruled that test identification parades conducted under Section 9 of the Evidence Act are not substantive evidence. These parades belong to the investigation stage and do not constitute substantive evidence; they are governed by Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The evidence from these parades is evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with courts determining the weight to be attached to such identifications .

Conspiracy:

— Supreme Court Observation:

• In Mohd. Khalid v. State of West Bengal (2002), the Supreme Court held that evidence of conspiracy is considered substantive evidence .

Admission:

— Supreme Court Cases:

• In Bharat Singh and Anr. v. Bhagirathi (1965), the Supreme Court stated that admissions are substantive evidence by themselves as per Sections 17 and 21 of the Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted .
• Similarly, in Bishwanath Prasad & Ors. v. Dwarka Prasad & Ors. (1973), the court noted that an admission by a party is substantive evidence if it meets the requirements of Section 21 of the Evidence Act .

FIR:

— Supreme Court Observation:

• In Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court clarified that an FIR is not considered substantive evidence .
• However, the Allahabad High Court in Pancham Yadav v. State of U.P. (1993) observed that an FIR can be treated as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act when the person who made the statement dies, thus becoming substantive evidence in such circumstances .

Dying Declaration:

— Supreme Court Cases:

• Justice Syed Shah Quadri in Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar (1998) emphasized that a dying declaration is substantive evidence and does not require corroboration .
• In Sudhakar & Anr. v. State Of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court reiterated that a dying declaration is substantive evidence, underscoring its exception to the hearsay rule .

Conclusion:

Substantive evidence is the testimony given by witnesses in court under oath, serving as a critical component of legal proceedings. It is considered robust and reliable, requiring no further corroboration in cases like dying declarations. However, its application varies across different sections of the Indian Evidence Act, with specific rules governing its admissibility and relevance in legal contexts. Understanding these nuances is essential for the proper administration of justice.

Question: What are the ingredients and related maxim of a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, and does a statement under this section include signs?

Answer:

Introduction: A dying declaration is a statement made by a person regarding the cause of their death or the circumstances leading to it. Under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, such declarations hold significant evidentiary value due to the presumption of truthfulness. This answer outlines the key ingredients, the legal maxim associated with dying declarations, and clarifies whether signs can be considered statements under this provision.

Main Body:

— Ingredients of a Dying Declaration:

I. Statement Requirement:

• There must be a statement, either written or verbal.

II. Subsequent Death:

• The statement must be made by a person who subsequently dies.

III. Relevant Fact:

• The statement must relate to a relevant fact.

IV. Cause or Circumstances of Death:

— The statement must pertain to:

• The cause of the person’s death, or
• Any circumstances of the transaction resulting in their death.

V. Relevance in Proceedings:

• Such statements are relevant in any type of proceeding where the cause of that person’s death comes into question.

VI. Expectation of Death:

• The expectation of death and the nature of the proceeding are immaterial.

Illustrations:

• Criminal Case: A statement by a victim indicating they were murdered by B.
• Criminal Case: A statement by a victim who died from injuries received during a rape.
• Civil Case: A statement by a deceased person indicating circumstances leading to their death, relevant to a suit by the widow.

— Maxim Related to Dying Declaration:

• Nemo Moriturus Praesumitur Mentiri:
• The relevancy of a dying declaration is based on the maxim “Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri,” meaning “a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth.”
• In Shakuntala v. State of Haryana (2007), the Supreme Court noted that dying declarations are admitted based on this principle.
• In Sudhakar & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (2000), the Supreme Court reiterated that dying declarations are accepted on the principle of necessity, supported by the same legal maxim.

Statement Inclusion of Signs:

— Case Reference: Queen Empress v. Abdullah (1885):

• The Allahabad High Court examined whether signs can be considered as statements under Section 32 of the Evidence Act.
• Facts: Abdullah was accused of cutting Dulari’s throat. Unable to speak, she responded to questions by making signs. She died shortly after.

Court’s Questions and Answers:

Question 1: Are signs considered conduct under Section 8?

• Answer: No, signs are not considered conduct under Section 8.

Question 2: Can signs be considered verbal statements under Section 32?

• Answer: Yes, signs combined with questions can be considered verbal statements under Section 32.

Question 3: Is the statement verbal?

• Answer: Yes, ‘verbal’ includes written and sign statements, not limited to spoken words.

Verbal vs. Oral:

• Verbal: A broader term encompassing written words, spoken words, and signs.
• Oral: A narrower term limited to words spoken by the mouth.

Conclusion: A dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act must be a statement made by a deceased person about their death’s cause or circumstances. Such declarations are presumed truthful based on the legal maxim “Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri.” The case of Queen Empress v. Abdullah clarifies that signs can indeed be considered verbal statements, broadening the scope of what constitutes a dying declaration. This inclusion ensures that even non-verbal communications by a dying person are given due evidentiary weight in legal proceedings.

Question: What is the meaning of a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, and what are the key differences between English and Indian law regarding dying declarations?

Answer:

Introduction: A dying declaration is a crucial piece of evidence in legal proceedings, especially in cases involving the cause of a person’s death. Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act outlines the admissibility of such statements. This answer discusses the definition of a dying declaration, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, and contrasts the differences between English and Indian laws concerning dying declarations.

Main Body:

Meaning of Dying Declaration: The Supreme Court in Sudhakar & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (2000) clarified the meaning and significance of dying declarations. According to the judgment:

• Definition: A dying declaration is a statement made by a person regarding the cause of their death or the circumstances leading to it. These statements are considered relevant facts and are admissible in evidence under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act.
• Admissibility: Such statements are admissible regardless of whether the person making the declaration expected to die or not.

In Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar (1998), Hon’ble Justice Syed Shah Quadri further elaborated that a dying declaration is relevant and admissible in cases where the cause of the declarant’s death is in question. He highlighted the importance of these statements in providing direct evidence about the circumstances of the death.

Difference between English Law and Indian Law:

Key Differences: The Supreme Court in Sudhakar & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (2000) outlined several distinctions between the English and Indian legal approaches to dying declarations:

1. Expectation of Death:

• English Law: A declaration must be made during the declarant’s expectation of death.
• Indian Law: The expectation of death is immaterial for the admissibility of a dying declaration.

2. Nature of Proceeding:

• English Law: Dying declarations are admissible only in criminal proceedings, specifically in cases of homicide or manslaughter.
• Indian Law: Dying declarations are admissible in all types of proceedings, including both criminal and civil cases.

3. Death/Circumstances:

• English Law: The statement must be related to the cause of the declarant’s death.
• Indian Law: The statement can relate to the cause of the declarant’s death or any circumstances of the transaction which resulted in their death.

4. Homicide/Suicide:

• English Law: Dying declarations do not include cases of suicide.
• Indian Law: Dying declarations cover both homicide and suicide cases.

Conclusion:

A dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act is a statement made by a person about the cause of their death or related circumstances, which is admissible in evidence irrespective of the expectation of death. The Indian law on dying declarations is broader than English law, allowing such statements to be used in both civil and criminal proceedings and including both homicide and suicide cases. These distinctions underscore the inclusive approach of Indian law in considering dying declarations as a significant piece of substantive evidence.

Question: What are the key facts and legal principles established in the case of Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor regarding the admissibility of statements under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872?

Answer:

Introduction: The case of Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor is a significant judgment that elucidates the scope of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This section deals with the admissibility of statements made by a person as to the cause of their death or the circumstances leading to their death. The Privy Council’s ruling in this case provided clarity on the interpretation of such statements.

Main Body:

Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor: The case details and the judicial reasoning are outlined as follows:

Facts:

• The deceased, Kuree Nukaraju, a peon, had borrowed money from the accused’s wife.
• On March 20, 1937, Nukaraju received a letter inviting him to Berhampur to collect his dues.
• Nukaraju informed his wife about the letter and left for Berhampur on March 21, 1937.
• On March 23, 1937, Nukaraju’s dismembered body was found in a steel trunk in a train compartment.
• The accused and his household members were arrested on April 4, 1937. The accused allegedly stated that the deceased had stayed at his house on March 21 and left on March 22.

Issue:

• Whether the statement made by the widow, that the deceased had told her he was going to Berhampur to receive payment from the accused’s wife, was admissible under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Privy Council Ruling:

• Admissibility of the Statement: The statement made by the deceased to his wife was admissible under Section 32(1) as it related to the cause of his death.
• Circumstances of the Transaction: The phrase “circumstances of the transaction” implies some limitations. It is narrower than “circumstantial evidence” and must have a proximate relation to the actual occurrence. In cases of prolonged poisoning, it may relate to events significantly earlier than the fatal dose.
• Confession: A statement containing self-exculpatory matter cannot amount to a confession if the exculpatory part negates the offense alleged. A confession must admit the offense or substantially all the facts constituting the offense. Admissions of incriminating facts alone do not constitute a confession.
• Rejection of Stephen’s Definition: The definition of confession suggested by Stephen, implying any statement suggesting the inference of committing a crime, was rejected as inconsistent with the natural use of language in the Indian Evidence Act.

Conclusion: The Privy Council upheld the conviction of the accused, affirming the admissibility of the widow’s statement under Section 32(1). This case set a precedent for interpreting the scope of “circumstances of the transaction” and the nature of admissible statements in the context of dying declarations.

Conclusion:

The case of Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor is pivotal in understanding the application of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. It established that statements related to the cause of death or the circumstances leading to it are admissible, even if made before the cause of death arose. This case also clarified the interpretation of “circumstances of the transaction” and provided guidance on what constitutes a confession.

Question: What are the key facts and legal principles established in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra regarding circumstantial evidence and dying declarations?

Answer:

Introduction: The case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) is a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India that addresses crucial aspects of circumstantial evidence and dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This case is renowned for establishing important legal principles and the “golden rule” or “Panchsheel” for evaluating circumstantial evidence.

Main Body:

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra: This case is pivotal in understanding the admissibility and evaluation of dying declarations and circumstantial evidence.

Facts:

• Manju and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda were married on February 11, 1982.
• Manju began living with her husband and his family in Pune.
• She was introduced to a mistress and was instructed to obey her commands. Despite her attempts to live peacefully, Manju was subjected to torture by her husband and his family.
• Manju narrated her plight in letters to her sister, Anju, cautioning her not to inform their parents to avoid causing them distress.
• Manju eventually died, and it was alleged that she was murdered by her husband using potassium cyanide.

Legal Proceedings:

• The trial court and the High Court rejected the theory of suicide, concluding that Manju was murdered by her husband.
• The Supreme Court, however, acquitted Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, ruling that the offense was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that if there are two possible views, the court should lean towards acquittal rather than conviction.

Key Legal Principles:

1. Exception to the Rule of Hearsay:

• Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay, making admissible the statements of a person who dies, whether the death is due to homicide or suicide, provided the statements relate to the cause of death or the circumstances leading to it.

2. Test of Proximity:

• The test of proximity should not be construed too literally. The distance of time depends on the circumstances of each case. Statements relevant to the immediate motive or directly connected steps leading to death are admissible.

3. Acceptance without Cross-examination:

• Statements under Section 32(1) are accepted without cross-examination because a person on the verge of death is unlikely to make a false statement. This replaces the need for cross-examination, assuming the statement was not secured by prompting or tutoring.

4. Homicide and Suicide:

• Section 32(1) applies to both homicide and suicide, making all relevant circumstances in homicide cases equally applicable to suicide cases.

5. Distance of Time:

• Statements and letters written by the deceased that are directly connected to their death and reveal a clear narrative fall within the scope of Section 32 and are admissible. The mere passage of time does not render such statements irrelevant.

Golden Rule / Panchsheel: The Court laid down five principles for evaluating circumstantial evidence:

1. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully established.
2. The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.
3. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
4. They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved.
5. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra significantly contributed to the jurisprudence on circumstantial evidence and dying declarations. It emphasized the necessity of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and provided clear guidelines for the admissibility and evaluation of such evidence, ensuring that justice is served while safeguarding the rights of the accused.

Question: What are the key facts and legal principles established in the case of Rattan Singh v. The State of Himachal Pradesh regarding the scope of dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act?

Answer:

Introduction: The Supreme Court case Rattan Singh v. The State of Himachal Pradesh (1996) is significant for clarifying the scope and interpretation of dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. The judgment elaborates on the difference between “circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death” and “circumstances which caused his death.”

Main Body:

Rattan Singh v. The State of Himachal Pradesh: This case is instrumental in understanding the admissibility and interpretation of dying declarations in Indian law.

Facts:

• Kanta Devi, the deceased, cried out just before being shot, identifying Rattan Singh as the person nearby with a gun. Her mother-in-law heard this exclamation.
• Immediately following her cry, a firearm was discharged, and Kanta Devi was fatally wounded.

Legal Proceedings:

• The Supreme Court, with Hon’ble Justice K.T. Thomas presiding, heard the case.
• The Court examined the admissibility of Kanta Devi’s statement under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act.

Key Legal Principles:

1. Comparison of Phrases:

• Justice K.T. Thomas highlighted the difference between the phrases “circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death” and “circumstances which caused his death.” The former has a broader scope, while the latter is narrower.

2. Wider Scope of Section 32(1):

• The term “circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death” encompasses a wider range of circumstances, not limited to the immediate cause of death. It includes any circumstances connected to the transaction that led to the death.
• Justice Thomas concluded that it is sufficient if the words spoken by the deceased refer to any circumstance related to the transaction culminating in their death, even if the connection is not direct or immediate.

3. Nexus Requirement:

• There need not be a direct nexus between the circumstances and the death. Even distant circumstances can be admissible under Section 32(1) as long as they have a connection with the transaction resulting in the death.

Conclusion:

• The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Rattan Singh, affirming that Kanta Devi’s dying declaration was admissible. The Court’s interpretation broadened the understanding of what constitutes relevant circumstances under Section 32(1), emphasizing the inclusivity of any related circumstances leading up to the death.

Conclusion:

The judgment in Rattan Singh v. The State of Himachal Pradesh extends the scope of dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. By distinguishing between the wider “circumstances of the transaction” and the narrower “circumstances which caused his death,” the Court reinforced the admissibility of broader contextual evidence, thereby providing a more comprehensive framework for evaluating dying declarations.

Question: What are the key facts and legal principles established in the case of Sudhakar & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra regarding the admissibility of dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act?

Answer:

Introduction: The case Sudhakar & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (2000) addresses the admissibility of dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. The Supreme Court’s decision highlights critical aspects of how dying declarations are interpreted and applied within Indian law.

Main Body:

[4.4.4.] Sudhakar & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra: This case involved the rape and subsequent suicide of a school teacher, Ms. Rakhi, and examined whether her FIR could be treated as a dying declaration.

Facts:

• Ms. Rakhi, a 20-year-old school teacher, was raped by Sudhakar Bhujbal (Principal) and Bhaskar (Teacher) on July 7, 1994.
• An FIR was lodged on July 20, 1994.
• Ms. Rakhi committed suicide on December 22, 1994, allegedly due to the trauma of the rape.

Legal Proceedings:

• The accused were charged with offenses under Sections 376 and 306 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
• The Sessions Court convicted them, treating the FIR as a dying declaration.
• The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction.
• The Supreme Court, however, reviewed whether the FIR could be considered a dying declaration.

Issue:

• The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the contents of the FIR lodged on July 20, 1994, could amount to a “dying declaration.”

Decision:

• The Supreme Court ruled that the FIR could not be accepted as a dying declaration.
• The Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish a proximate relationship between the rape and Ms. Rakhi’s suicide beyond reasonable doubt.
• The conviction of the accused was overturned, and they were acquitted.

Legal Principles:

1. Principle of Necessity:

• Dying declarations are admitted in evidence on the principle of necessity.

2. Legal Maxim:

• The principle behind dying declarations is based on the legal maxim “Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire,” meaning a person on the verge of death is not presumed to lie.

3. Meaning of Dying Declaration:

• Sub-Section (1) of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act states that statements made by a person about the cause of their death or any circumstances leading to it are admissible in evidence.

4. Admissibility Criteria:

• Dying declarations are admissible only if they refer to the cause of death or any circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the death.

5. Difference Between English and Indian Law:

• English Law requires that the declaration be made under the expectation of impending death, whereas Indian Law does not.
• Indian Law allows statements related to both homicide and suicide, not just the direct cause of death.

6. Proximity Test:

• The statements must have a proximate relation to the actual occurrence of death. This proximity varies with the circumstances of each case.

7. Nexus Theory:

• Following the Ratan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh ruling, it is established that even distant circumstances can be admissible if they have a connection with the transaction resulting in death.

8. Exception to Hearsay Rule:

• Section 32 is an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence.

9. Substantive Evidence:

• Dying declarations are considered substantive evidence in legal proceedings.

Conclusion:

In Sudhakar & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court clarified that the FIR could not be treated as a dying declaration due to a lack of proximate relationship between the rape and the subsequent suicide. This case underscores the stringent requirements for treating statements as dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, emphasizing the necessity for a clear and direct connection to the cause or circumstances of death.

Question: What are the key facts and legal principles established in the case of Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat regarding the admissibility and scope of dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act?

Answer:

Introduction: The case of Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat (2001) addresses important issues regarding the admissibility of dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case clarifies the scope of such declarations and their admissibility in criminal proceedings.

Main Body:

Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat: This case involves the murder of Asha Ben, who made several dying declarations before her death. The Supreme Court was tasked with evaluating the admissibility of these declarations and their impact on the conviction of the accused.

Facts:

• Asha Ben was attacked by Patel Hiralal Joitaram, who doused her with a combustible liquid and set her on fire on October 21, 1988.
• She survived long enough to provide multiple statements identifying her attacker.
• The FIR initially named the accused as ‘Hiralal Lalchand,’ but this was later corrected to ‘Hiralal Joitaram’ during the investigation due to a clerical error regarding the name of the father.

Legal Proceedings:

• The Sessions Court acquitted the accused.
• The High Court convicted the accused based on the evidence including the dying declarations.
• The Supreme Court reviewed the admissibility of these dying declarations.

Supreme Court Decision:

• Arguments of Appellant: The appellant’s senior counsel argued that statements recorded by the police under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) are inadmissible. Additionally, even if admissible, such statements could not be used under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act if they merely addressed the accused’s parentage.
• Reply of Court: The Supreme Court noted that dying declarations fall under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act and are exempt from the ban on statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC. The Court observed that the statements were sufficient to identify the accused and met the criteria for admissibility under Section 32(1).

Legal Points:

1. Categories of Statements Under Section 32(1):

• Category One: Statements regarding the cause of death.
• Category Two: Statements regarding any circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death.

2. Scope of Categories:

• The second category is broader and includes any circumstance that has a nexus with the death, whether proximate or distant, direct or indirect. The aim is to include rather than exclude statements that may help in understanding the transaction leading to death.

3. Admissibility and Reliability:

• Once a dying declaration is deemed admissible, the court must assess its reliability. If reliable, the statement is used to determine its utility in the case.

4. Comparison with Previous Cases:

• The Court accepted the propositions from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra regarding the timing of dying declarations and considered the principles established in Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh.

Conclusion:

In Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat, the Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of dying declarations, recognizing them as substantive evidence under Section 32(1). The Court’s decision reinforced the principle that such declarations are critical in understanding the circumstances of death and can include both direct and indirect references related to the cause of death. The accused was convicted based on the reliable evidence provided by the dying declarations.

Question: What are the significant legal principles established in the case of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra regarding the admissibility and weight of dying declarations, particularly in the context of conflicting judgments on the requirement of medical certification?

Answer:

Introduction: The Supreme Court’s decision in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) addresses crucial aspects of the admissibility and evidentiary value of dying declarations. The case is significant for its clarification on whether a medical certificate is mandatory for the admissibility of a dying declaration and how to assess the truthfulness and reliability of such statements.

Main Body:

Laxman v. State of Maharashtra: This case was decided by a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court due to conflicting judgments on the admissibility of dying declarations when medical certification is not provided.

Facts:

• Chandrakala, the deceased, made a dying declaration to a judicial magistrate and others before her death. She was physically and mentally fit at the time of making the declaration.
• The Sessions Court convicted the accused based on this dying declaration. The Bombay High Court upheld this conviction, finding the declaration to be truthful and reliable.
• The Supreme Court faced conflicting decisions from previous judgments on whether a medical certificate confirming the declarant’s mental fitness was required for the declaration to be admissible.

Conflicting Judgments:

• Judgment Relied Upon by Appellant: The appellant cited Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1999), arguing that without a medical certificate confirming the declarant’s mental fitness, the dying declaration could not be accepted.
• Judgment Relied Upon by State Counsel: The counsel for the State referred to Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat (1999), which held that a dying declaration is admissible even without a specific endorsement from the doctor, provided the evidence shows that the deceased was conscious and capable of making the statement.

Constitutional Bench Decision: The Constitutional Bench examined both conflicting judgments and provided clarity on several key points:

1. Juristic Theory:

• Dying declarations are made under the belief that the declarant, facing imminent death, has no motive to lie and thus speaks the truth. However, the Court emphasized the need for caution in evaluating such evidence due to the possibility of external influences or errors.

2. Oath and Cross-Examination:

• The requirement for oath and cross-examination is dispensed with in dying declarations because the declarant’s imminent death is considered to ensure truthfulness. Despite this, the Court stressed that the declaration must inspire full confidence in its truthfulness and correctness.

3. Duty of the Court:

• The Court must ensure that the declaration was not influenced by external factors such as tutoring or prompting. It must also confirm that the declarant was in a fit mental state to make the statement and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant.

4. Medical Opinion vs. Eyewitness Testimony:

• While medical opinion is typically relied upon to assess the declarant’s mental state, eyewitness testimony indicating that the declarant was conscious and capable of making the statement can outweigh the need for medical certification. Thus, a declaration is not automatically invalidated due to the absence of a medical certificate.

5. Mode and Recording of Dying Declarations:

• A dying declaration can be oral or written and made through any method of communication, including signs or gestures. The recording of such statements does not necessarily require the presence of a magistrate, although having one can help assure authenticity.

6. Evidentiary Value:

• The evidentiary value of a dying declaration depends on the circumstances of each case. The person recording the declaration must be satisfied of the declarant’s mental fitness, but a declaration can still be valid if it is shown to be voluntary and truthful even without a doctor’s certification.

Conclusion:

The Constitutional Bench in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra affirmed that a dying declaration can be admissible without a specific medical certification, provided it meets other criteria of reliability and truthfulness. The decision reinforced the principle that the Court must evaluate the context and conditions of the dying declaration carefully, relying on the totality of evidence to ensure its validity. The matter was sent back to lower courts to decide the case based on these observations, without directly addressing the conviction or acquittal.

Use of Dying Declaration Made to Police or Investigating Officer: Dying declarations made to police officers or investigating officers are not affected by Section 162 of the CrPC, which generally prohibits the use of statements made to police during investigation. Sections 27 and 32 of the Indian Evidence Act provide exceptions to this rule, affirming that such declarations are substantive evidence.

Question: Can a dying declaration be the sole basis for the conviction of an accused, and what are the key considerations for its admissibility and reliability according to Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay?

Answer:

Introduction: The Supreme Court’s decision in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (1957) addresses whether a dying declaration, by itself, can serve as the sole basis for convicting an accused. This case is pivotal in understanding the conditions under which a dying declaration may be sufficient for a conviction and the considerations affecting its reliability.

Main Body:

[4.4.7.] Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay: The Supreme Court decided this case on September 25, 1957. The central issue was whether a dying declaration alone, without corroboration, could form the basis for a conviction.

Facts:

• Khushal Rao and other accused were involved in a violent attack on Baboolal. The attack resulted in Baboolal being hospitalized, where he died the following morning.
• Baboolal made multiple dying declarations to a doctor, a Sub-Inspector, and a Judicial Magistrate. These declarations consistently named Khushal Rao and others as the perpetrators.
• The High Court acquitted one of the accused, Tukaram, due to discrepancies in the dying declaration regarding his identity. However, it upheld Khushal Rao’s conviction based on the dying declarations and his suspicious conduct post-incident.

Supreme Court Issue: The Supreme Court addressed whether a dying declaration, even without corroboration, can be sufficient for conviction.

Key Observations:

1. Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act:

• Section 32 is an exception to the general rule against hearsay evidence. Dying declarations are admissible despite not being subjected to cross-examination or oath, based on the belief that a person on the brink of death would speak the truth.

2. Reliability of Dying Declaration:

• The Court emphasized that while a dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction, its reliability must be assessed. Factors affecting reliability include:
• Timing: The declaration should be made at the earliest opportunity.
• Recording: It must be properly recorded without external influences or leading questions.
• Consistency: The statement should be consistent and not influenced by interested parties.

3. No Absolute Rule Requiring Corroboration:

• There is no absolute rule that a dying declaration must be corroborated to be the basis for conviction. Its sufficiency depends on the specific facts and circumstances of the case.

4. Dying Declaration as Reliable Evidence:

• A dying declaration stands on the same footing as other types of evidence. It should be evaluated in light of the surrounding circumstances and principles governing the assessment of evidence.

5. Forms of Dying Declaration:

• A declaration recorded in the form of questions and answers by a competent authority is given higher evidentiary value than one based on oral testimony alone.

6. Test for Reliability:

• To test reliability, the Court considers factors such as the opportunity for observation, mental state of the declarant, consistency of the declaration, and whether it was made without external influence.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay upheld Khushal Rao’s conviction based solely on the dying declaration. The Court concluded that a dying declaration can be sufficient for conviction if it meets the criteria of truthfulness, reliability, and is made under circumstances that suggest its accuracy. The case established that while corroboration can strengthen the case, it is not an absolute requirement if the dying declaration is credible and convincing on its own.

Key Takeaway: A dying declaration can indeed be the sole basis for conviction if it is shown to be reliable, consistent, and made under appropriate circumstances. Each case must be assessed individually, considering the specific facts and context in which the declaration was made.

Question: In Mukesh & Anr. v. State for NCT of Delhi & Ors., how did the Supreme Court address the role of dying declarations in the context of conviction, and what guidelines were established for their admissibility and reliability?

Answer:

Introduction: The Supreme Court’s decision in Mukesh & Anr. v. State for NCT of Delhi & Ors. (2017) concerning the Delhi Gang Rape Case, provides significant insights into the evidentiary value of dying declarations. This case, known for its brutal nature and widespread impact, also explored the role of dying declarations in criminal convictions.

Main Body:

Mukesh & Anr. v. State for NCT of Delhi & Ors.: The Supreme Court decided this landmark case on May 5, 2017. The case involved the brutal gang rape and murder of a young woman in Delhi, which led to several legal discussions, including the admissibility and reliability of dying declarations.

Facts:

• On December 16, 2012, a 23-year-old woman was brutally assaulted and raped by a gang of six men in a bus. She died from her injuries on December 29, 2012.
• The victim made three dying declarations, all consistent with each other and corroborated by other evidence.
• The case garnered significant public attention, leading to death sentences for the accused, confirmed by the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Observations on Dying Declarations:

1. Dying Declaration as Sole Basis for Conviction:

• The Supreme Court affirmed that a dying declaration is an important piece of evidence that can be the sole basis for conviction if it is found to be voluntary and truthful. Corroboration is not always necessary if the court is satisfied with the declaration’s reliability.

2. Guidelines from Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi:

• The Court accepted and applied the guidelines established in Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi. These guidelines were discussed in the judgment and are crucial for determining the admissibility and weight of a dying declaration:

3. Positive Guidelines:

• Sole Basis of Conviction (Point 1): A dying declaration can serve as the sole basis for conviction if it inspires full confidence in the court.
• Fit Mental Condition & No Tutoring (Point 2): The court must be assured that the declaration was made by the deceased in a fit mental state and was free from external influences like tutoring or prompting.
• Conviction Without Corroboration (Point 3): A declaration found to be true and voluntary can support a conviction without additional corroborative evidence.
• True Dying Declaration (Point 10): If the declaration is found to be true, coherent, and consistent after careful scrutiny, it can be used for conviction even without corroboration.

4. Negative Guidelines:

• Suspicious Dying Declaration (Point 5): If the declaration is suspicious or dubious, it should not be relied upon without corroborative evidence.
• Infirmity (Point 6): A declaration made under circumstances where the deceased was unconscious or incapable of making a coherent statement cannot be the basis for conviction.

5. Directory Guidelines:

• Corroboration is a Rule of Prudence (Point 4): Corroboration is not a legal necessity but a rule of prudence. It is advisable but not mandatory for a dying declaration to be corroborated.
• Whole Detail Not Necessary (Point 7): A declaration does not need to contain every detail of the occurrence to be valid.
• Brief Statement (Point 8): A brief statement should not be dismissed solely for its brevity.
• Eyewitness vs. Medical Opinion (Point 9): An eyewitness’s account of the deceased’s mental state takes precedence over medical opinions if it indicates the declaration’s reliability.

Conclusion:

In Mukesh & Anr. v. State for NCT of Delhi & Ors., the Supreme Court underscored that a dying declaration can be sufficient for conviction if it meets the criteria of truthfulness and reliability. The Court adopted and reinforced the guidelines from Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi, highlighting that while corroboration is not always required, the dying declaration must inspire confidence in its authenticity and be free from any external influences. The case reaffirms the significant role of dying declarations in the criminal justice system, provided they are assessed carefully against established guidelines.

Question: What is the evidentiary value of a dying declaration if the victim survives, and how do the cases of Maqsoodan & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ram Prasad v. State of Maharashtra address this issue?

Answer:

Introduction: Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence when the maker of the statement is deceased. If the victim survives, the statement cannot be considered a dying declaration under this provision. This issue was addressed in two key cases: Maqsoodan & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ram Prasad v. State of Maharashtra.

Main Body:

Evidentiary Value of Dying Declaration if Victim Survives:

1. Maqsoodan & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh (December 15, 1982):

— Facts: The case involved an assault where the victim survived. A dying declaration was recorded, but the victim did not die.

— Supreme Court’s Observations:

• The Court ruled that a statement made in expectation of death, if the person survives, does not qualify as a dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act.
• Since the victim survived, the statement was not admissible under Section 32. Instead, it could be used under Section 157 of the Evidence Act, which allows for former statements made by witnesses to corroborate their testimony in court.

— Conclusion: In Maqsoodan, the statement made by the survivor was relevant under Section 157 for corroborative purposes, rather than Section 32.

2. Ram Prasad v. State of Maharashtra (May 12, 1999):

— Facts: In this case, the victim survived despite a violent attack. The statement, recorded as a dying declaration, was not made under the dying condition.

— Supreme Court’s Observations:

• The Court agreed that the statement, despite being recorded as a dying declaration, could not be used under Section 32 of the Evidence Act if the victim was alive.
• The statement recorded during investigation, particularly if made to a magistrate under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., could be used for corroboration under Section 157 of the Evidence Act. Statements made to police officers during investigation were not admissible for corroboration due to Section 162 of the Cr.P.C.
• The Court clarified that a statement made to a magistrate under Section 164, while not qualifying as a dying declaration if the victim survives, remains relevant for purposes of corroboration or contradiction in accordance with Sections 145, 155, and 157 of the Evidence Act.

— Conclusion: If the victim survives, their statement is not admissible as a dying declaration under Section 32. Instead, it is relevant under Sections 145, 155, and 157 of the Evidence Act and subject to the conditions of Sections 162 and 164 of the Cr.P.C.

Conclusion:

In summary, a dying declaration under Section 32(1) is only applicable if the victim has died. If the victim survives, their statement does not qualify as a dying declaration but can still be relevant for corroborative purposes under Sections 145, 155, and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Maqsoodan & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ram Prasad v. State of Maharashtra.

Question: What is the burden of proof under Section 104 of the Indian Evidence Act, and how does it apply in the context of proving a dying declaration?

Answer:

Introduction: Section 104 of the Indian Evidence Act outlines the burden of proof required to establish facts necessary for making certain evidence admissible. This section is crucial in determining who must prove foundational facts to enable the admission of evidence, such as a dying declaration.

Main Body:

Burden of Proof:

1. Section 104 of the Indian Evidence Act:

• Provision: “The burden of proving any fact necessary to be proved in order to enable any person to give evidence of any other fact is on the person who wishes to give such evidence.”
• Explanation: This section places the responsibility on the party seeking to introduce evidence to first establish any foundational facts required for that evidence to be admissible.

2. Application in the Context of Dying Declaration:

— Illustration:

• Example: Suppose “A” wishes to prove a dying declaration made by “B”. To introduce B’s dying declaration into evidence, A must first prove that B is deceased. This is because the admissibility of a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act is contingent upon the death of the declarant.

— Burden of Proof:

• Foundation Facts: A must establish the fact of B’s death to make the dying declaration admissible. Without proving that B is deceased, the statement cannot be admitted as a dying declaration.
• Evidence Requirements: The party seeking to introduce the dying declaration must provide sufficient evidence to prove that the condition precedent (i.e., the death of B) has been met. This may involve presenting certificates of death, testimony, or other relevant documents to establish the fact of death.

Conclusion:

Under Section 104 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden of proving foundational facts necessary to make evidence admissible falls on the party wishing to introduce that evidence. In the case of a dying declaration, this means that the proponent of the dying declaration must first prove the death of the declarant to satisfy the requirements of Section 32(1) and make the statement admissible in court.

Question: What is the relevance and application of Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding evidence given in judicial proceedings, and under what conditions can such evidence be used in subsequent proceedings?

Answer:

Introduction: Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with the admissibility of evidence given in one judicial proceeding for the purpose of proving the truth of facts stated in that evidence during a subsequent proceeding. This provision ensures that evidence from earlier stages can be utilized effectively under specific conditions, particularly when the original witness is unavailable.

Main Body:

Section 33: Relevancy of Evidence in Subsequent Proceedings

1. Provision:

• Section 33: “Evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding, or before any person authorized by law to take it, is relevant for the purpose of proving, in a subsequent judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts which it states, when the witness is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or if his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, the Court considers unreasonable.”

2. Conditions for Admissibility:

• Proceeding Between Same Parties: The subsequent proceeding must be between the same parties or their representatives in interest. This ensures that the evidence is being used in a context where the same legal interests are at stake.
• Opportunity for Cross-Examination: The adverse party in the original proceeding must have had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the witness. This condition guarantees that the evidence was subject to scrutiny and challenge when it was originally presented.
• Substantially Same Issues: The issues in the original and subsequent proceedings must be substantially the same. This requirement ensures that the evidence remains relevant to the issues being adjudicated in the later stage or proceeding.

3. Explanation:

• Criminal Proceedings: In criminal trials, the prosecution and the accused are deemed to be the parties within the meaning of Section 33. This means that evidence given during an earlier stage of the criminal proceedings can be used in later stages, provided the conditions are met.

Conclusion:

Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act allows for the use of evidence given in previous judicial proceedings in subsequent proceedings under specific conditions. The evidence is relevant if the original witness is unavailable due to death, inability to be found, incapacity, or if obtaining their presence would involve unreasonable delay or expense. The conditions include the necessity for the same parties or their representatives being involved, the opportunity for cross-examination in the original proceeding, and the issues being substantially similar. This section ensures that valuable evidence can be utilized effectively even when the original witness is no longer available.