Confession under section 24 to 30 of IEA, 1872

Question: What is the legal definition of “confession” under the Indian Evidence Act, and how have various jurists interpreted it?

Answer:

Introduction

The concept of “confession” is pivotal in criminal law, especially under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Though not explicitly defined in the Act, several interpretations by jurists and courts have shaped its understanding. This answer explores the various definitions of “confession” as discussed in landmark cases and legal texts.

Meaning of Confession

1. Definition by Sir Stephen

• Source: A Digest of the Law of Evidence (1876)
• Definition: Sir Stephen, a foundational figure in Indian evidence law, defined a confession as “an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime and suggesting the inference that he committed that crime.”
• Relevance: This definition highlights that a confession must imply guilt and be made by the accused. It emphasizes that confessions, if voluntary, are relevant only against the person who makes them.

2. Definition by Justice Atkin

• Case: Pakala Narayanaswami v. King-Emperor (1939)
• Positive Definition: Justice Atkin defined a confession as “one that either admits in terms the offence or substantially all the facts constituting the offence.”
• Negative Definition: He also clarified that a statement containing self-exculpatory matter, which if true would negate the offence, cannot be considered a confession.
• Significance: This definition refines the concept by insisting that confessions must directly or indirectly acknowledge the offence. It excludes statements that provide a defense or deny the facts of the crime.

3. Acceptance by Justice M.C. Mahajan

• Case: Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab
• Definition: Justice Mahajan upheld Justice Atkin’s definition, reinforcing the idea that a confession must admit the offence or the essential facts constituting it.

4. Definition by Justice Shah

• Case: State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya
• Definition: Justice Shah described a confession as a “statement made by a person stating or suggesting the inference that he has committed a crime.”
• Interpretation: This definition aligns closely with the idea of suggesting guilt, consistent with earlier definitions but expressed in slightly different terms.

5. Conclusion by Justice R.B. Bachawat

• Case: Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar
• Definition: Justice Bachawat succinctly defined a confession as “an admission of the offence by a person charged with the offence.”
• Overview: This definition simplifies the concept by directly linking confession with admission of the offence, reinforcing its role as an acknowledgment of guilt.

Conclusion

The legal understanding of “confession” has evolved through various judicial interpretations. Sir Stephen’s broad definition laid the foundation, while Justice Atkin’s refinement excluded self-exculpatory statements. Subsequent interpretations by Justices Mahajan, Shah, and Bachawat have consistently upheld the core idea that a confession involves an admission of guilt or the essential facts of the offence. Each jurist’s contribution has clarified and solidified the concept, making it crucial for evidence and procedural law in India.

Question: What is the distinction between judicial and extra-judicial confessions, and what are the conditions for their admissibility and use in convictions?

Answer:

Introduction

Confessions play a crucial role in criminal law, and understanding their types and admissibility is essential for legal practitioners. Confessions are categorized into judicial and extra-judicial, each having different implications for their use in legal proceedings. This answer outlines these categories and the criteria for their admissibility.

Judicial Confession

Definition:

• Source: State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (Justice Arijit Pasayat)
• Meaning: Judicial confessions are those made before a Magistrate or Court during judicial proceedings. This includes confessions recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., which mandates the presence of a Magistrate.

Characteristics:

• Value: Judicial confessions are considered substantive evidence. Their value is enhanced due to the procedural safeguards in place during their recording.
• Proof Method: To prove a judicial confession, it is not necessary to call the Magistrate or Court official as a witness. The record of the confession itself serves as evidence.

Extra-Judicial Confession

Definition:

• Source: State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (Justice Arijit Pasayat)
• Meaning: Extra-judicial confessions are made outside the formal judicial setting, such as to private individuals or in a private capacity before a judicial officer who is not specifically authorized under Section 164 to record confessions.

Characteristics:

— Value: Extra-judicial confessions are not considered substantive evidence by default. Their admissibility depends on the credibility of the witness to whom the confession was made.

— Conditions for Use:

• Credibility: The witness must be unbiased and credible. The confession must be clear, unambiguous, and devoid of any motive for fabrication.
• Proof Method: To use an extra-judicial confession as evidence, the witness before whom it was made must be called to testify.

Key Judicial Observations

1. In State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram:

• Judicial vs. Extra-Judicial Confession: Justice Arijit Pasayat distinguished between the two types, noting that while extra-judicial confessions are not inherently weak, their value depends on the context and the witness’s reliability.
• Reliability: The confession can be used for conviction if it meets the rigorous test of credibility. The evidence must be subjected to scrutiny to ensure it is not tainted by bias or ulterior motives.

2. In Sansar Chand v. State Of Rajasthan (Justice Markandey Katju):

• Rule on Corroboration: There is no absolute rule that an extra-judicial confession must always be corroborated by other evidence. However, corroboration is generally recommended to bolster its credibility.

Comparison Between Judicial Confession and Extra-Judicial Confession

Meaning:
- Judicial Confession:
 • Made before a Magistrate or Court
- Extra-Judicial Confession:
 • Made outside the formal judicial setting

Value:
- Judicial Confession:
 • Substantive evidence
- Extra-Judicial Confession:
 • Not inherently substantive
 • Depends on context

Conviction:
- Judicial Confession:
 • Can be used without corroboration
- Extra-Judicial Confession:
 • Usually requires corroboration for safety

Proof Method:
- Judicial Confession:
 • No need to call the recording authority as a witness
- Extra-Judicial Confession:
 • Must call the witness before whom the confession was made

Legal Weight:
- Judicial Confession:
 • Generally given more weight in court
- Extra-Judicial Confession:
 • Often scrutinized more closely

Formality:
- Judicial Confession:
 • Made under formal, controlled conditions
- Extra-Judicial Confession:
 • Can be made in various informal settings

Recording:
- Judicial Confession:
 • Officially recorded by the court
- Extra-Judicial Confession:
 • May be recorded informally or not at all

Retraction:
- Judicial Confession:
 • More difficult to retract
- Extra-Judicial Confession:
 • Easier to retract or deny

Conclusion

Judicial and extra-judicial confessions are crucial in criminal proceedings but differ significantly in their handling and admissibility. Judicial confessions benefit from procedural safeguards and are substantive evidence, while extra-judicial confessions depend heavily on the witness’s credibility and often require corroboration. Understanding these distinctions helps in the proper application of confessional evidence in legal proceedings.

Question: What is the legal treatment of retracted confessions, and how do inculpatory and exculpatory statements affect the use of confessions in legal proceedings?

Answer:

Introduction

Confessions are critical pieces of evidence in criminal cases, but their legal value can be affected by various factors, including whether a confession is retracted and the nature of the statements contained within it. This answer explores the treatment of retracted confessions and differentiates between inculpatory and exculpatory statements in the context of legal proceedings.

Retracted Confession

Definition and Significance:

• Source: Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan (1962)
• Meaning: A retracted confession occurs when an accused or co-accused initially confesses to a crime but later denies having made such a confession. The evidentiary value of a retracted confession is a significant issue in criminal law.

Legal Principles:

• Admissibility: The Supreme Court has established that a retracted confession can still serve as the basis for a conviction if the court is convinced of its truth and voluntary nature. However, it is generally advisable to corroborate a retracted confession with additional evidence.
• Rule of Prudence: The court’s preference for corroboration is a rule of prudence rather than a strict legal requirement. While a retracted confession can be used without corroboration if its truth is established, relying solely on it without corroboration is considered unsafe.

Case Analysis:

• Case Facts: In Pyare Lal Bhargava, the accused retracted his confession made under pressure from a Chief Engineer. The court noted that the threat did not constitute coercion, and thus, the confession could be considered if corroborated.

Inculpatory and Exculpatory Statements

Definitions:

• Inculpatory Statement: An inculpatory statement admits to committing a crime. It is a direct acknowledgment of guilt.
• Exculpatory Statement: An exculpatory statement denies guilt or provides a justification that negates the crime. It is an attempt to absolve oneself from the charges.

Legal Implications:

— Case Law:

• Emperor v. Balmakund (Allahabad High Court): The case addressed whether a court can accept only the inculpatory part of a confession while rejecting the exculpatory part. The court ruled that a confession must be accepted or rejected in its entirety. If the exculpatory part of the confession is inherently incredible, it does not permit selective acceptance of the inculpatory part.
• Pakala Narayanaswami v. King-Emperor (1939): Justice Atkin emphasized that a confession containing exculpatory elements cannot be considered a valid confession if those elements negate the offence.
• Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab (1952): The Supreme Court held that a confession should be treated as a whole. The court rejected the practice of accepting only the inculpatory portions and disregarding the exculpatory portions. In this case, the confession was deemed exculpatory, and thus, the accused was acquitted.

Key Judicial Observations

1. In Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar (1965):

• Whole Confession Rule: The Supreme Court reiterated that a confession must be evaluated in its entirety. It cannot be divided into parts for the purpose of selectively accepting or rejecting parts of it.

Conclusion

Retracted confessions pose significant challenges in criminal proceedings. While they can form the basis of a conviction, corroboration is generally necessary to ensure their reliability. Additionally, confessions that contain both inculpatory and exculpatory statements must be evaluated as a whole, rather than in parts, to determine their legal value. Understanding these principles helps in ensuring fair and accurate judicial outcomes.

Question: What are the implications of Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act on confessions, and how was it interpreted in the case of Veera Ibrahim v. State of Maharashtra?

Answer:

Introduction

Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, deals with the admissibility of confessions in criminal proceedings. It aims to ensure that confessions are made voluntarily and are not the result of inducement, threat, or promise. This section is crucial in safeguarding the rights of the accused. The landmark case of Veera Ibrahim v. State of Maharashtra (1976) provides significant insights into the application of Section 24.

Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act

Text of Section 24:

• Provision: A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding if it appears to the Court that it was caused by any inducement, threat, or promise related to the charge against the accused person, originating from a person in authority and deemed sufficient by the Court to give the accused reasonable grounds to believe that making the confession would provide an advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature.

Essential Elements to Attract Section 24:

1. Confession: The statement in question must be a confession.
2. Accused Person: The confession must be made by the accused person.
3. Person in Authority: It must be made to a person in authority.
4. Inducement, Threat, or Promise: The confession must be obtained by reason of inducement, threat, or promise from a person in authority.
5. Reference to the Charge: The inducement, threat, or promise must have reference to the charge against the accused.
6. Sufficient Grounds: The inducement, threat, or promise must be sufficient to make the accused believe that they would gain an advantage or avoid evil by making the confession.

Case Analysis: Veera Ibrahim v. State of Maharashtra

Facts:

• Accused: Abdul Umrao Rauf (Accused №1) and Veera Ibrahim (Accused №2).
• Incident: The accused were involved in the transportation of contraband goods in a truck. The goods were loaded under the cover of darkness at Reti Bunder. The truck skidded near the Dongri police station, leading to the seizure of the truck and goods by the police.
• Charges: They were prosecuted under Section 5 of the Import & Export (Control) Act, 1947, and Sections 135(a) and 135(b) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues:

1. Applicability of Article 20(3) of the Constitution: Whether the statement made by Veera Ibrahim under Section 108 of the Customs Act was hit by Article 20(3), which protects against self-incrimination.
2. Confession under Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act: Whether the statement was a confession and if so, whether it was irrelevant under Section 24 due to inducement, threat, or promise.
3. Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction: Whether the evidence was sufficient to uphold Veera Ibrahim’s conviction.

Supreme Court Observations:

Issue 1: Article 20(3) of the Constitution:

• Accused Definition: The Supreme Court held that Veera Ibrahim was not an “accused” at the time of his statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act since no formal accusation or FIR was filed against him then.
• Conclusion: The statement was not hit by Article 20(3) as he was not compelled to self-incriminate at that stage.

Issue 2: Confession under Section 24:

• Nature of Statement: The Supreme Court ruled that Veera Ibrahim’s statement was not a confession as it did not admit to the offence in terms or substantially all the facts constituting the offence. It was an admission of an incriminating fact, which is not the same as a confession.
• Person in Authority: The Customs Officer was a person in authority, but the warning about perjury did not create a belief in the accused that he would gain an advantage by making the statement.
• Conclusion: Section 24 was not applicable. The statement was treated as an admission relevant under Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Issue 3: Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction:

• Evidence Considered: The court considered the seizure of contraband goods, the circumstances of the arrest, the appellant’s admission, and other corroborative evidence.
• Conclusion: The conviction was upheld as the evidence sufficiently proved the accused’s involvement in the offence.

Conclusion

Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act ensures that confessions induced by threats, promises, or inducements are not admissible. In the case of Veera Ibrahim v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court clarified the distinction between a confession and an admission, emphasizing the importance of voluntary statements. The ruling reinforced the principle that confessions must be scrutinized for their voluntariness and the context in which they were made to protect the rights of the accused.

Question: What is the significance of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, and how has its application been interpreted in various judicial decisions?

Answer:

Introduction

Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, explicitly states that confessions made to police officers are inadmissible in court. This provision aims to safeguard the rights of the accused and ensure that any confession presented as evidence is made voluntarily and without coercion. Understanding Section 25 involves examining its purpose, definition of key terms, and interpretation through landmark cases.

Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act

Text of Section 25:

• Provision: No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.

Purpose of Section 25

In Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India (1990):

• Purpose: The Supreme Court identified two primary purposes for the restriction under Section 25:

1. Protection Against Coercion: To protect the accused from third-degree methods (i.e., torture or coercive interrogation techniques) that may be employed by the police.
2. Ensure Proper Investigation: To ensure a proper and scientific investigation aimed at bringing the actual culprit to justice, rather than relying on forced confessions.

Confession

Definition and Applicability:

• Confession: A confession must either admit the offence in terms or substantially admit all the facts constituting the offence. Section 25 applies only when the statement in question is a confession. If it is not a confession, Section 25 is not applicable.

Nasir Ali v. State of U.P.:

• This case addressed the evidentiary value of FIRs, the burden of proof in criminal cases, and the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything).

Faddi v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1964):

• Facts: Faddi reported to the police that he saw his stepson’s body in a well, leading to the registration of an FIR. Initially, other suspects were arrested, but later, Faddi himself was arrested and convicted for the murder.
• Supreme Court’s Observation: The court held that Faddi’s report to the police was not a confession. It was an admission of certain facts relevant to the case. The report was admissible under Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, as it was not a statement made during the investigation and not barred by Section 25 or Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Meaning of Police Officer

Key Conditions to Be Considered a Police Officer Under Section 25:

1. Power to Investigate: The individual must have the authority to conduct investigations.
2. Power to Prosecute: The individual must have the authority to submit a police report and prosecute.

Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore & Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India:

• These cases clarified that for an individual to be considered a police officer under Section 25, they must possess both the power to investigate and the power to submit a police report, thus having the authority to prosecute.

Conclusion

Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act plays a crucial role in ensuring the fairness of criminal proceedings by excluding coerced confessions made to police officers. Through judicial interpretation, it is clear that this provision aims to protect the rights of the accused and promote thorough, unbiased investigations. The landmark cases discussed highlight the importance of distinguishing between confessions and admissions and clarify the criteria for who qualifies as a police officer under this section. These interpretations ensure that the provision serves its intended purpose effectively.

Question: How has the Indian judiciary interpreted the scope of the term “police officer” under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act in landmark cases such as Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore and Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India?

Answer:

Introduction

Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states that any confession made to a police officer is inadmissible in court. The interpretation of who qualifies as a “police officer” under this section has significant implications for the admissibility of confessions in criminal proceedings. The judiciary has provided clarity on this matter through various landmark judgments, particularly in Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore and Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India.

Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore (1966)

Facts of the Case:

• The appellant, residing in a village near Goa, was found in possession of contraband gold during a raid on his house on November 27, 1960.
• He was arrested on November 30, 1960, and subsequently made a confession.
• The appellant was prosecuted under Section 167 of the Sea Customs Act.

Issue:

• Whether the confession made to a Central Excise Officer would be inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Supreme Court’s Interpretation:

• The Court held that a Central Excise Officer is not a police officer under Section 25 of the Evidence Act.
• The Supreme Court observed that even though Section 21(2) of the Central Excise & Salt Act, 1944, confers on the Central Excise Officer the same powers as an officer-in-charge of a police station investigating a cognizable case, it does not grant the power to submit a charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
• Conclusion: An officer does not become a police officer under Section 25 of the Evidence Act unless he has the power to submit a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The designation alone is not sufficient; the actual powers held by the officer are crucial.

Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India (1990)

Facts of the Case:

• Officers of the Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) intercepted a truck and recovered a large quantity of hashish.
• The individuals involved made confessional statements to the DRI officials.
• The case was registered under the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) and the Customs Act, 1962. The confession was used against the accused.
• The accused argued that the confession was inadmissible under Section 25 because DRI officers were police officers under this section.

Supreme Court’s Interpretation:

• The Court reiterated that even if an officer is invested with powers analogous to those of a police officer under any special law, he does not become a police officer under Section 25 of the Evidence Act unless he has the power to lodge a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
• Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, as the DRI officers did not have the power to submit a police report under Section 173. Therefore, they were not considered police officers for the purposes of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The determination of a “police officer” is based on the actual powers possessed by the individual, not merely their designation.

Conclusion

The interpretation of “police officer” under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act hinges on the specific powers vested in the officer. Through landmark cases such as Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore and Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India, the judiciary has clarified that an officer must have both the power to investigate and the authority to submit a police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be considered a police officer under Section 25. This interpretation ensures that confessions made under coercion or undue influence by officers without prosecutorial powers are excluded from evidence, protecting the rights of the accused and upholding the integrity of the judicial process.

Question: What is the scope of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding confessions made to police officers, and how has it been interpreted in various cases?

Answer:

Introduction

Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, stipulates that confessions made to police officers are inadmissible in court against the accused. This provision is crucial in safeguarding individuals from potential coercion and abuse of power by law enforcement. The scope and application of Section 25 have been elucidated through several judicial pronouncements.

Scope of Section 25

Text of Section 25:

• “No confession made to a police-officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.”

Purpose of Section 25:

• As elucidated in Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India, the purpose of Section 25 is two-fold:

1. To protect the accused from third-degree methods and coercive practices.
2. To ensure a proper and scientific investigation of crimes to bring the real culprits to justice.

Key Interpretations and Cases

Confessional FIR and Police Officers:

1. Superintendent of Excise:

• In certain jurisdictions, like under the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, a Superintendent of Excise can be considered a police officer for the purposes of Section 25.

2. Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) Officers:

• Officers of the DRI, even if they have powers akin to those of police officers under special laws like the NDPS Act, are not considered police officers under Section 25 unless they have the authority to file a police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Sita Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1965):

Facts:

• Sita Ram, suspecting his wife of infidelity, murdered her and wrote a confession letter to the Sub-Inspector.
• This letter was found near the dead body and seized by the police.

Issue:

• Whether the confession in the letter is admissible under Section 25.

Supreme Court’s Ruling:

• The letter was not hit by Section 25 as it was not made to a police officer and the police officer was not present or aware of its writing. The confession was deemed admissible.

Problem Scenario:

— Situation:

• ‘A’ writes a letter to his friend ‘C’ confessing to a murder. This letter later falls into the hands of the police.

— Analysis:

• The confession in the letter is admissible as evidence since it was not made to a police officer, nor was ‘A’ in police custody at the time of confession.

(3.13.7.5) Use of Section 25:

— Admissibility Against Accused:

• Confessions made to police officers are inadmissible against the accused.

— Use in Favor of Accused:

• However, such confessions can be used in favor of the accused. For instance, if the confession supports a defense such as the right of private defense under grave and sudden provocation, it can be admitted to benefit the accused.

Conclusion

Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act plays a critical role in protecting accused persons from coercive practices by police officers. The judiciary has clarified its application through various cases, emphasizing that confessions made to police officers are inadmissible against the accused, but can be used in their favor. This nuanced interpretation ensures a balance between safeguarding individual rights and ensuring justice.

Question: What are the provisions and implications of Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding confessions made while in police custody?

Answer:

Introduction

Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, further elaborates on the inadmissibility of certain confessions, specifically focusing on those made by individuals in police custody. The section aims to protect accused persons from potential coercion and ensures that only confessions made under specific conditions are admissible in court.

Provisions of Section 26

Text of Section 26:

• “No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police-officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.”

Explanation:

• The term “Magistrate” in this context does not include village heads performing magisterial functions unless they have magisterial powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Two Parts of Section 26:

1. Rule:

• Any confession made by an accused while in police custody is inadmissible against them unless made in the immediate presence of a magistrate.

2. Exception:

• If a confession is made in the immediate presence of a magistrate while the accused is in police custody, it can be used against the accused.

Meaning of Custody

Understanding the concept of “custody” is crucial for interpreting Section 26. Custody implies the restriction of an individual’s liberty of movement, where the person is under direct or indirect surveillance of the arresting authority, typically a police officer.

Illustrations:

1. Confession to a Doctor:

• If the police arrest an accused and bring them to a doctor, with the police waiting outside, a confession made to the doctor would be inadmissible as the accused is still in police custody.

2. Custody by Villagers:

• If a woman arrested for murder is left in the custody of villagers while the police go to the station, a confession made to the villagers would still be inadmissible as she remains in police custody.

3. Confession to a Tonga Driver:

• If the police temporarily leave an accused in the custody of a tonga driver, any confession made to the driver would be inadmissible, as the accused is still considered to be in police custody. Temporary absence of the police does not change the status of custody.

Conclusion

Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act provides vital protections for accused individuals, ensuring that confessions made under police custody are treated with skepticism unless made in the immediate presence of a magistrate. This safeguard helps prevent potential abuses of power and coerced confessions, thereby upholding the integrity of the judicial process.

Question: What are the provisions and implications of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding the admissibility of information received from an accused in police custody?

Answer:

Introduction

Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, addresses the admissibility of information received from an accused person while in police custody. This section serves as an exception to the general rule that confessions made to police officers are inadmissible, provided specific conditions are met.

Provisions of Section 27

Text of Section 27:

• “Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”

Key Points:

1. Constitutional Validity:

• The constitutional validity of Section 27 was upheld by the Supreme Court of India in State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhaya (1960) and State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961), confirming that it does not violate Article 14 or Article 20(3) of the Constitution.

2. Leading Case: Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor:

• This landmark case clarified the interpretation and scope of Section 27. The Privy Council emphasized that only the portion of the information leading to the discovery of a fact is admissible, not the entire statement.

Constitutional Validity of Section 27

• In State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhaya (1960), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 27 against challenges under Article 14.
• In State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961), the Supreme Court ruled that Section 27 does not violate Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which protects against self-incrimination.

Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor

Facts of the Case:

• Nine accused were prosecuted and convicted for murder and rioting. Their confessions were challenged as inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.

Key Observations by the Privy Council:

1. Section 27 Not Artistically Worded:

• The Privy Council noted that Section 27 is not artistically drafted but serves a specific legal purpose.

2. Exception to Sections 25 and 26:

• Section 27 acts as an exception to the inadmissibility of confessions under Sections 25 and 26.

3. Conditions for Applicability:

• Discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused in police custody.
• The information must be deposed to, and only the part of the information distinctly related to the discovered fact is admissible.

4. Jurisprudence Behind Section 27:

• The rationale is that discovery of a fact in consequence of information given by the accused provides a guarantee of the truth of the information, allowing it to be used in evidence.

5. Extent of Admissible Information:

• Only the portion of the information directly leading to the discovery of the fact is admissible.
• Information about past use or history of the object discovered is not admissible.

6. Difference Between Facts Discovered and Produced:

• The fact discovered includes the place and knowledge of the accused about the object.
• For example, stating “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” leads to the discovery of the knife’s location, not its discovery as an object.

7. Application of Section 27:

• Typically invoked when an accused in police custody produces an object (e.g., a weapon) from a concealed location related to the crime.

8. Admissibility of Confession/Statement:

• Only the part of the confession distinctly related to the discovery of facts is admissible. For instance, “I hid it and my stick in the rick of Venkatanarasu in the village. I will show if you come” is admissible, while other parts of the confession are not.

Conclusion

Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act provides a nuanced approach to the admissibility of information received from an accused in police custody. By allowing only the portion of the information that leads to the discovery of a fact to be admissible, it balances the need for evidence with the protection of the accused from coerced confessions. This section has been upheld as constitutionally valid and continues to play a crucial role in criminal investigations and prosecutions.

Question:

What are the legal implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar regarding the evidentiary value of FIR and the applicability of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act?

Introduction

The case of Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar is a significant Supreme Court ruling that elucidates the evidentiary value of First Information Reports (FIRs) and the scope of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The decision underscores the limitations on the admissibility of confessional statements made to police officers and the criteria for admissibility under Section 27.

Facts of the Case

• Aghnoo Nagesia was accused of committing four murders by using an axe (tangi). The victims included his aunt, her daughter, her son-in-law, and the son of the son-in-law.
• The motive was related to property inheritance disputes.
• Aghnoo narrated the incident to his uncle and later confessed to the police, leading to the recovery of the bodies, the axe, and blood-stained clothes.
• The trial court convicted him, and the High Court partially accepted the conviction.
• Aghnoo appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the entire FIR was a confession and should be inadmissible.

Supreme Court Decision

(3.13.9.3) Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar

Evidentiary Value of FIR:

• Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates the recording of the first information.
• An FIR is not substantive evidence but can corroborate the informant (Section 157) or contradict him (Section 145) if called as a witness.
• An FIR given by the accused is admissible against him as evidence of conduct (Section 8) and as an admission (Section 21), but a confessional FIR to a police officer is inadmissible due to Section 25.

Confessional FIR:

• The entire FIR was deemed a confessional statement, thus inadmissible under Section 25, except parts relevant under Section 27.

Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act:

• Section 27 allows for the admissibility of information leading to the discovery of a fact, provided the information was received from an accused in police custody.
• The Supreme Court held that Section 27 partially lifts the ban imposed by Sections 24, 25, and 26 concerning the admissibility of information directly leading to the discovery of a fact.
• However, the information must distinctly relate to the discovered fact to be admissible.

Supreme Court’s Rationale:

1. Meaning of “Accused”:

• The term “accused of any offence” includes a person accused during the trial, irrespective of their status at the time of the confession.

2. Definition of Confession:

• Confession is defined as an admission of the offence by the person charged.
• Various legal definitions and case laws (e.g., Pakala Narayanaswami v. King-Emperor) were considered to elaborate on the nature of confessions.

3. Division of FIR:

• The Supreme Court rejected the division of the FIR into parts, stating that confessional statements cannot be separated into admissible and inadmissible segments.
• Only the parts of the FIR leading to the discovery of facts under Section 27 are admissible.

Acquittal of Aghnoo Nagesia:

• The Supreme Court acquitted Aghnoo Nagesia, stating that the relevant parts of the FIR under Section 27 were insufficient for conviction.
• The discovery of the axe, bodies, and blood-stained clothes were admissible under Section 27 but did not conclusively establish guilt.

Conclusion

The decision in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar highlights the stringent requirements for the admissibility of confessional statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The case emphasizes that while Section 27 allows for the admissibility of certain information leading to the discovery of facts, the information must be directly and distinctly related to the discovered fact. Additionally, the ruling clarifies that confessional FIRs cannot be partially accepted; they must be wholly excluded except for parts admissible under Section 27. This decision serves as a precedent for the treatment of confessional statements and the evidentiary value of FIRs in criminal proceedings.

Question: What are the key legal principles established by the Supreme Court in Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra regarding the applicability of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act?

Answer:

Introduction

The case of Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, decided by the Supreme Court on September 09, 1975, is crucial for understanding the intricacies of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This provision acts as an exception to the general prohibition on the admissibility of confessional statements made to police officers. The case elucidates the conditions under which such statements can be considered admissible and the rationale behind this partial lifting of the ban.

Facts of the Case

• Inayatullah was accused of stealing three drums containing phosphorus pentaoxide, valued at Rs. 300, from the premises of the Bombay Port Trust on August 1, 1968.
• He made a confessional statement to the police: “I will tell the place of deposit of the three Chemical drums which I took out from the Haji Bunder on 1st August.”
• Based on this information, the police recovered the stolen drums.
• The trial court convicted Inayatullah, and he appealed to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Decision

Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra

Key Legal Principles:

1. Grounds for Section 27 Exception:

• The phrase “Provided that” and “whether it amounts to a confession or not” indicate that Section 27 serves as an exception to Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act.

2. Four Conditions of Section 27:

• First Condition: Discovery of a relevant fact in consequence of the information received from the accused.
• Second Condition: The fact discovered must be deposed to.
• Third Condition: The accused must be in police custody when giving the information.
• Fourth Condition: Only the information directly related to the fact discovered is admissible; the rest must be excluded.

3. Meaning of ‘Distinctly’:

• The word ‘distinctly’ means directly, indubitably, strictly, unmistakably. It limits the scope of admissible information to what directly causes the discovery of the fact.

4. Discovery of Fact as Guarantee of Truth:

• The rationale for the exception is that the discovery of a fact based on the information given by the accused provides some guarantee of the truth of that information.

5. Meaning of ‘Facts Discovered’:

• Initially, ‘facts discovered’ was thought to refer only to physical objects. It is now established that it includes the place of the object and the accused’s knowledge of it.

6. Only Part of the Statement Admissible:

• In this case, only the first part of the statement, “I will tell the place of deposit of the three Chemical drums,” was admissible. The rest, detailing the past history of the drums, was inadmissible as it was not directly related to the discovery.

7. Decision:

• The Supreme Court concluded that the facts proved by the prosecution and the admissible portion of the accused’s statement could lead to two equally possible hypotheses: (1) Inayatullah deposited the drums himself, or (2) he knew where they were. The second hypothesis was compatible with innocence, entitling Inayatullah to the benefit of the doubt. Consequently, the Court allowed his appeal, set aside his conviction, and acquitted him.

Conclusion

The ruling in Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra underscores the precise application of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, emphasizing that only the part of the confessional statement leading directly to the discovery of facts is admissible. This case clarifies the stringent conditions under which such information can be admitted as evidence, reinforcing the principle that the remaining parts of the confession must be excluded to ensure fairness and justice in criminal proceedings.

Question: What key principles regarding Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act were established in Bodh Raj @ Bodha and Ors v. State of Jammu and Kashmir?

Answer:

Introduction

The case of Bodh Raj @ Bodha and Ors v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, decided by the Supreme Court on September 3, 2002, is significant for its interpretation of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The judgment elaborates on the admissibility of information leading to the discovery of facts and the distinction between recovery and discovery under the law.

Facts of the Case

In this case, the appellants were convicted based on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution relied heavily on the information provided by the accused that led to the discovery of certain facts. The appellants challenged the admissibility and sufficiency of this evidence.

Supreme Court Decision

Bodh Raj @ Bodha and Ors v. State of Jammu and Kashmir

Key Legal Principles:

1. “So much of such information” under Section 27:

• The phrase “so much of such information” as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is crucial. The admissibility of the information under Section 27 is limited to that part which directly leads to the discovery of the fact. The extent of admissible information depends on the exact nature of the fact discovered.

2. Doctrine of Confirmation:

• The principle underlying Section 27 is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. This doctrine holds that if any fact is discovered as a result of information provided by an accused, the discovery itself serves as a guarantee of the truth of that information. The information may be confessional or non-inculpatory, but it becomes reliable if it leads to the discovery of a fact.
• It is crucial to differentiate between recovery and discovery. Recovery of an object is not equivalent to the discovery of a fact as envisaged under Section 27. The focus is on the discovery of new information or facts as a result of the accused’s information.

3. Circumstantial Evidence:

• The Court reiterated that a person can be convicted based on circumstantial evidence alone, provided such evidence is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence must be strong enough to establish a consistent and unbroken chain leading to the conclusion of the accused’s guilt.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court in Bodh Raj @ Bodha and Ors v. State of Jammu and Kashmir clarified the scope and application of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The ruling emphasized that only the portion of the information directly leading to the discovery of a fact is admissible, reinforcing the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. Additionally, the case distinguished between the concepts of recovery and discovery, highlighting the importance of discovering new facts rather than merely recovering objects. This case serves as an essential reference for understanding the nuances of Section 27 and its application in criminal jurisprudence.

Question: What are the rules regarding the relevance of confessions made under inducement, promise of secrecy, and by co-accused under Sections 28, 29, and 30 of the Indian Evidence Act?

Answer:

Introduction: The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, delineates the conditions under which confessions are admissible in court. Sections 28, 29, and 30 specifically address the relevance of confessions made under certain circumstances, including those made after inducement, promises of secrecy, and by co-accused persons.

Main Body:

Section 28: Confession After Removal of Impression Caused by Inducement

• This section states that if a confession, as referred to in Section 24, is made after the court is satisfied that the impression caused by any inducement, threat, or promise has been fully removed, such a confession is relevant.
• Essentially, the court must ensure that any external influence that might have compromised the voluntariness of the confession has dissipated, making the confession admissible.

Section 29: Confession Not Rendered Irrelevant by Promise of Secrecy

— Section 29 deals with the admissibility of confessions that remain relevant even if obtained under specific conditions:

• Made under a promise of secrecy.
• Obtained through deception practiced on the accused for the purpose of obtaining the confession.
• Made while the accused was intoxicated.
• Made in response to questions the accused was not obliged to answer.
• Made without the accused being warned that they were not bound to confess and that such confession might be used as evidence against them.

— This section underscores that the relevance of a confession is maintained regardless of these conditions, provided the confession is otherwise relevant.

Section 30: Confession by Co-Accused

• Section 30 addresses the relevance of confessions made by one accused person that implicate both themselves and others when tried jointly for the same offence.
• The court may consider such a confession against both the person who made it and the co-accused.

— Explanation:

• The term “offence” in this context includes abetment of or attempt to commit the offence.

Illustrations:

— Joint Trial (Illustration a):

• A and B are jointly tried for the murder of C. A’s confession stating “B and I murdered C” can be considered against B.

— No Joint Trial (Illustration b):

• A is on trial for the murder of C. There is evidence suggesting A and B committed the murder, and B confessed “A and I murdered C.” Since B is not being jointly tried with A, this confession cannot be considered against A.

Conclusion:

Sections 28, 29, and 30 of the Indian Evidence Act ensure the relevance of confessions under various conditions. Section 28 allows for confessions made after removing inducement effects, Section 29 maintains the relevance of confessions made under secrecy, deception, intoxication, or without warnings, and Section 30 permits considering confessions made by co-accused in joint trials. These provisions collectively ensure that relevant confessions are admissible, upholding the integrity of the judicial process while protecting the rights of the accused.

Question: What are the significant judicial interpretations of Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act in the landmark cases of Bhuboni Sahu v. The King and Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh?

Answer:

Introduction: Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act allows the court to consider confessions made by one accused affecting themselves and others jointly tried for the same offense. Landmark cases such as Bhuboni Sahu v. The King and Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh have provided critical interpretations of this provision.

Main Body:

Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (1949)

— Case Background:

• This case involved the murder of Kalia, where Bhuboni Sahu and others were implicated.
• Justice John Beaumont delivered the judgment on February 17, 1949, which became a landmark decision concerning Section 133 (Accomplice) and Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act.

— Key Observations:

1. Reason for Admissibility:

• An accused person’s admission of their own guilt lends some credibility to their confession regarding others’ involvement.

2. Nature of Evidence:

• A confession by a co-accused is considered very weak evidence.

3. Confession of Co-Accused Not Evidence Under Section 3:

— It does not fall under the definition of ‘evidence’ in Section 3 because:

• It is not given under oath.
• It is not given in the presence of the accused.
• It cannot be tested by cross-examination.

4. Comparison with Approver’s Evidence:

• It is weaker than the evidence of an approver, which does not suffer from the same infirmities.

5. Risk of Including Innocents:

• There is a prevalent risk in India of implicating innocent persons along with the guilty. Therefore, independent evidence implicating each accused is crucial to safeguard against wrongful convictions.

Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952)

— Case Background:

• Decided on March 4, 1952, by Justice Vivian Bose, this case involved the murder of a senior officer’s five-year-old son by Kashmira Singh, who was previously terminated from his job based on a report by the victim’s father.
• A co-accused, Gurubachan, made a confession implicating Kashmira Singh.

— Key Observations and Conclusion:

• The Supreme Court upheld the principles laid down in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King, reinforcing that a co-accused’s confession is a weak form of evidence and should be treated with caution.
• The judgment highlighted the necessity of independent evidence to corroborate the confession made by a co-accused.
• The case emphasized that reliance on co-accused confessions alone, without independent supporting evidence, is insufficient for conviction.
• The decision in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King was followed, reiterating the cautious approach courts must take in dealing with confessions under Section 30.

Conclusion:

The landmark judgments in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King and Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh significantly clarified the application of Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act. These cases underscore the weak evidentiary value of confessions made by co-accused and the importance of corroborative independent evidence to ensure the fairness and accuracy of convictions. This judicial interpretation aims to prevent wrongful convictions by safeguarding against the risks associated with relying solely on co-accused confessions.