Accomplice Evidence u/s- 133 and clause (b) of S-114 in IEA, 1872

Question: What is the relationship between Section 114(b) and Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding the testimony of an accomplice?

Answer:

Introduction

The term “accomplice” originates from the Latin phrase “Participes criminis.” In Indian law, the role and testimony of an accomplice are governed by Section 114, Illustration (b) and Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act (IEA), as well as Sections 306 to 308 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). Several landmark cases, including Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (1949), R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration (1962), Haroon Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra (1967), Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana (1975), and Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra (1977), have shaped the legal understanding of an accomplice’s testimony.

Main Body

Section 114(b) and Section 133: Definitions and Principles

Section 114(b): Presumption regarding Accomplice Testimony

• Text: The court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars.
• Principle: This section introduces a presumption of caution, suggesting that an accomplice’s testimony should be viewed with suspicion and requires corroboration.

Section 133: Competency of Accomplice as a Witness

• Text: An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
• Principle: This section establishes the competency of an accomplice as a witness and allows convictions based solely on their testimony, even without corroboration.

Differences Between Section 114(b) and Section 133

1. Nature of Provision:

• Section 114(b): Provides a presumption (not mandatory) that an accomplice’s testimony is unreliable unless corroborated.
• Section 133: Declares the legal competency of an accomplice to testify against the accused, even if the testimony is uncorroborated.

2. Language:

• Section 114(b): Uses the word “may,” indicating a discretionary presumption.
• Section 133: Uses the word “shall,” indicating a mandatory declaration of competency.

3. Rule Type:

• Section 114(b): Deals with the “Rule of Prudence,” advising caution and the need for corroboration.
• Section 133: Deals with the “Rule of Law,” stating that an accomplice’s testimony is legally acceptable and sufficient for conviction without corroboration.

Case Law and Judicial Interpretation

Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra (1977): The Supreme Court examined the relationship between Sections 114(b) and 133, emphasizing that while Section 133 allows for conviction based on an accomplice’s testimony, Section 114(b) advises caution. The court must carefully evaluate the credibility of the accomplice and seek corroboration where possible.

Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (1949) and R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration (1962): These cases further illustrated the principle that an accomplice’s testimony, although legally competent, should be scrutinized for reliability and corroborated to ensure justice.

Conclusion

The relationship between Section 114(b) and Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act reflects a balance between legal competency and judicial prudence. While Section 133 establishes the admissibility and sufficiency of an accomplice’s testimony for conviction, Section 114(b) advises courts to exercise caution and seek corroboration. This dual approach ensures that the judicial process remains fair and just, preventing wrongful convictions based on potentially unreliable testimony.

Question: What is the significance of Section 306 of the CrPC regarding the tender of pardon to an accomplice?

Answer:

Introduction

The concept of an accomplice in criminal law involves a person who participates in or is privy to the commission of a crime. Section 306 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) outlines the provisions for tendering a pardon to such an accomplice, aiming to obtain crucial evidence for the prosecution. This section, along with Sections 114(b) and 133 of the Indian Evidence Act (IEA), plays a significant role in the criminal justice system by balancing the need for evidence and the principles of justice.

Main Body

Section 306 of the CrPC: Key Provisions

Section 306(1): Tender of Pardon

— Purpose: The primary purpose of Section 306 is to obtain the evidence of any person directly or indirectly involved in or privy to an offence.

— Authority:

• Chief Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate: Can tender a pardon at any stage of the investigation, inquiry, or trial of the offence.
• Magistrate of the First Class: Can tender a pardon at any stage of the inquiry or trial.

— Condition: The pardon is conditional upon the accomplice making a full and true disclosure of all relevant facts and the involvement of others in the offence, whether as principals or abettors.

Section 306(3): Procedure

• Recording Reasons: Every Magistrate who tenders a pardon must record their reasons for doing so.
• Acceptance of Pardon: The Magistrate must also record whether the person to whom the pardon was tendered accepted it or not.

Practical Implications of Section 306

Roles and Processes

• During Investigation, Inquiry, or Trial: The provision allows for flexibility in timing, enabling the authorities to seek crucial evidence at various stages of the criminal process.
• Decision to Tender Pardon: It remains at the discretion of the Magistrate, who must ensure that the conditions of the pardon are met, primarily the full disclosure of facts.

Outcomes of Pardon

• Accomplice Who Accepts Pardon: If the accomplice accepts the pardon and fulfills the conditions, they become an approver. An approver’s testimony is then competent under Section 133 of the IEA.
• Accomplice Who Does Not Accept Pardon: If the accomplice does not accept the pardon, they remain an accomplice, and their testimony is still competent under Section 133, albeit with the usual caution advised by Section 114(b) of the IEA.

Revocation of Pardon

• Non-compliance: If the accomplice fails to comply with the conditions of the pardon, the pardon can be withdrawn. Even if the pardon is withdrawn, the testimony of the accomplice remains competent under Section 133 of the IEA.

Conclusion

Section 306 of the CrPC serves a crucial function in criminal proceedings by enabling the authorities to secure vital evidence from accomplices through the tender of pardon. This provision balances the need for evidence with judicial prudence, ensuring that the testimony of accomplices can be used effectively while maintaining safeguards against potential misuse. The relationship between Section 306 and Sections 114(b) and 133 of the IEA highlights the intricate legal framework designed to uphold justice while leveraging the testimony of those involved in criminal activities.

Question: What is the difference between an ‘Accomplice’ and an ‘Approver’ under the Indian Evidence Act and the Criminal Procedure Code?

Answer:

Introduction

In legal terminology, the terms “accomplice” and “approver” are often used in the context of criminal law to describe individuals who have participated in a crime. The distinction between these terms is crucial, especially in the context of the Indian Evidence Act (IEA) and the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). This section elaborates on these differences and the significance of each role within the judicial system.

Main Body

Accomplice vs. Approver in the Indian Evidence Act

Accomplice:

• Defined as a person involved in committing a crime.
• Mentioned in Sections 114 (Illustration b), 133, and 156 of the IEA.
• An accomplice is considered a competent witness under Section 133, which states that a conviction is not illegal merely because it is based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
• Section 114, Illustration (b) allows the court to presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars.

Approver:

• The term “approver” is not explicitly used in the IEA but is implied within the legal framework.
• An approver is essentially an accomplice who has been granted a pardon on the condition of making a full and true disclosure of all facts concerning the offence.
• Despite being termed as an “approver,” the individual is still considered an accomplice under the IEA and is subject to the same rules regarding their testimony’s credibility.

Accomplice vs. Approver in the Criminal Procedure Code

Accomplice:

• The term is used in the marginal note and content of Section 306 of the CrPC.
• An accomplice can be offered a tender of pardon under Sections 306 and 307, which they can either accept or reject.
• If the tender is accepted and the accomplice fulfills the conditions, they become an approver.
• Not all accomplices become approvers, but all approvers are former accomplices.

Approver:

• An approver is an accomplice who has accepted a tender of pardon and agreed to make a full and true disclosure of all facts related to the offence.
• The CrPC does not explicitly use the term “approver,” but the concept is well-understood within the legal framework.
• An approver’s testimony is considered crucial for the prosecution, provided they meet the conditions of the pardon.

Practical Implications and Judicial Interpretations

• The Supreme Court of India, in cases like Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana and Mrinal Das & Ors. v. The State of Tripura, has used the terms “accomplice” and “approver” interchangeably, although the CrPC makes a clear distinction between the two.
• Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana (1975): The term “approver” was used extensively, indicating its practical importance in legal proceedings.
• Mrinal Das & Ors. v. The State of Tripura: The Supreme Court used both terms interchangeably, underscoring that while the CrPC distinguishes between them, their roles and implications often overlap in judicial practice.

Conclusion

The distinction between an accomplice and an approver is significant within the Indian legal system. While the Indian Evidence Act treats both terms similarly, the Criminal Procedure Code differentiates between an accomplice and an approver based on whether the individual has accepted a tender of pardon. Understanding these differences is crucial for comprehending how testimony from individuals involved in crimes is evaluated and utilized in legal proceedings.

Question: Who is an accomplice under the Indian Evidence Act?

Answer:

Introduction

The concept of an accomplice plays a crucial role in criminal law, especially in understanding the nuances of criminal liability and evidence. Although the Indian Evidence Act does not explicitly define an “accomplice,” judicial interpretations have provided clarity on its meaning and implications. The landmark judgment in Jagannath v. Emperor offers significant insights into the classification and role of an accomplice.

Main Body

Meaning and Classification of Accomplice

Jagannath v. Emperor (1942): This case is pivotal in discussing the meaning and classification of an accomplice. The key points highlighted in this judgment are:

1. Ordinary Meaning: The term “accomplice” has not been defined in the Indian Evidence Act, thus it should be understood in its ordinary sense. An accomplice is a guilty associate or partner in crime, connected with the offence in question, or someone who makes admissions showing a conscious hand in the offence.
2. Participation in Crime: All accessories before the fact, if they participate in the preparation for the crime, are considered accomplices. Mere knowledge of the crime does not make one an accomplice.
3. Case-Specific Determination: Whether a person is an accomplice depends on the facts of each case and the nature of the crime. A person must participate in the same crime as the accused to be considered an accomplice.
4. Principles for Ordinary Witnesses: If a witness does not meet the criteria of an accomplice, their testimony must be judged based on principles applicable to ordinary witnesses.
5. Accessories Before the Fact: Those who participate in preparing for the crime are accomplices, but those who only have knowledge of the crime are not.

Judicial Definitions

Davies v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1954): This case provided a comprehensive definition of an accomplice:

1. Participants in Crime: Individuals who are principals or accessories before or after the fact in committing, procuring, or aiding and abetting a crime.
2. Receivers of Stolen Goods: Considered accomplices of the thieves from whom they receive goods.
3. Similar Crimes: Parties to crimes similar to the one charged can be considered accomplices.

R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration (1962): The Supreme Court of India followed the definition from Davies, stating:

• An accomplice is someone who participates in the actual crime charged against an accused.
• Even if not a direct participant (particeps criminis), receivers of stolen property and accomplices in previous similar offences are considered accomplices for evidentiary purposes.

Classification of Accomplices

Jagannath v. Emperor (1942) further classified accomplices into four categories:

1. Principal in the First Degree: The person who physically commits the crime or uses an innocent instrumentality or agent to do so.
2. Principal in the Second Degree: An individual who intentionally helps another commit a crime while present at the scene (e.g., a lookout).
3. Accessories Before the Fact: Those who counsel, incite, encourage, or procure the commission of a crime. If their involvement is limited to knowledge of the crime, they are not accomplices.
4. Accessories After the Fact: Individuals who support the criminal after the crime has been committed, such as by receiving stolen property or harboring the accused.

Conclusion

An accomplice, as understood through judicial interpretations, is someone who actively participates in a crime, either directly or indirectly. The classification provided by the Jagannath v. Emperor case helps delineate the different levels of participation that qualify someone as an accomplice. This understanding is crucial for evaluating the credibility and admissibility of an accomplice’s testimony in court.

Question: What is the burden of proof regarding an accomplice’s testimony and the differences between an accomplice/approver and a co-accused under the Indian Evidence Act?

Answer:

Introduction

The Indian Evidence Act, through various judicial interpretations, establishes guidelines for evaluating the testimony of accomplices and approvers. Understanding the burden of proof associated with accomplice testimony and the distinctions between an accomplice/approver and a co-accused is essential in legal proceedings.

Main Body

Burden of Proof

Jagannath v. Emperor (1942): This landmark judgment discusses the burden of proof related to accomplice testimony. The key points include:

1. Burden on the Accused: The burden of proving that a witness is an accomplice usually lies with the party alleging it, typically the accused.
2. Prosecution’s Duty: The prosecution is obligated to inform the court about the accomplice nature of the evidence.

Differences Between Accomplice/Approver and Co-Accused

Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (1949): Justice Beaumont highlighted the distinctions between the evidence provided by a co-accused and an accomplice/approver. The Supreme Court reaffirmed these distinctions in Mohd. Khalid v. State of West Bengal (2002). The primary differences are:

1. Provision:

• Accomplice: Governed by Section 114, Illustration (b), and Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act.
• Co-Accused: Governed by Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act.

2. Value of Evidence:

• Accomplice: Considered stronger evidence. The court in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King stated that an accomplice’s testimony is more reliable than a co-accused’s confession.
• Co-Accused: Deemed weaker evidence. A co-accused’s confession lacks the same legal robustness as it is not made under oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and cannot be cross-examined.

3. Oath:

• Accomplice: Testimony must be given under oath.
• Co-Accused: Confessions are not required to be under oath.

4. Presence of Other Party:

• Accomplice: Testimony cannot be given in the absence of the other party.
• Co-Accused: Confession can be made even in the absence of other co-accused.

5. Cross-Examination:

• Accomplice: Testimony can be tested by cross-examination.
• Co-Accused: Confessions cannot be cross-examined, thus lacking this crucial aspect of legal scrutiny.

6. Scope:

• Accomplice: No limitation on the testimony scope.
• Co-Accused: Limited only to confessions.

Conclusion

Understanding the burden of proof regarding an accomplice’s testimony and the distinctions between an accomplice/approver and a co-accused is vital in legal contexts. The judgments in Jagannath v. Emperor and Bhuboni Sahu v. The King provide crucial guidance on these matters, emphasizing the stronger evidentiary value of an accomplice’s testimony compared to a co-accused’s confession. These legal principles ensure that testimonies are evaluated with the appropriate level of scrutiny and reliability in judicial proceedings.

Question: What are the key points and the decision in the case of Bhuboni Sahu v. The King?

Answer:

Introduction

The case of Bhuboni Sahu v. The King is a significant judgment that addresses the evidentiary value of statements made by co-accused and accomplices. This case, decided by the Privy Council, delves into the differences in the legal treatment of confessions by co-accused versus testimony by approvers/accomplices under the Indian Evidence Act (IEA).

Main Body

Facts of the Case

— Incident: The case revolves around the murder of Kalia Behra, a jutka driver, on October 11, 1946.

— Charges: Eight persons were charged with murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

— Key Witnesses:

• Kholi Behra: Became an approver and provided evidence.
• Trinath: Made a confession under Section 164 CrPC, but retracted it during the trial.
• Recovery Evidence: Loin cloth and a grass-cutting instrument (khantibadi) linked to the crime were recovered.

Judicial Proceedings

1. Sessions Judge: Convicted six of the accused, including Bhuboni Sahu (Accused №7) and Trinath (Accused №5).
2. High Court of Patna: Upheld the conviction of four accused, including Bhuboni Sahu and Trinath.
3. Privy Council: Reviewed whether the evidence against Bhuboni Sahu was sufficient for conviction.

Key Points Established by the Privy Council

1. Accomplice Evidence (Sections 114 Ill. (b) & 133):

• An accomplice’s uncorroborated testimony is admissible but unsafe to rely on without corroboration.
• An accomplice cannot corroborate another accomplice; their testimonies must be independently corroborated.

2. Confession of Co-Accused (Section 30):

• Confessions of co-accused are weak evidence and do not fall under the definition of “evidence” per Section 3 of the IEA.
• Such confessions are not given on oath, are not made in the presence of the accused, and cannot be cross-examined.
• They are only corroborative and require additional independent evidence to support a conviction.

3. Comparison of Accomplice and Co-Accused Evidence:

• Section 133: Represents the rule of law allowing conviction based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, though it is unsafe.
• Section 114 (b): Embodies the rule of prudence, advising corroboration in material particulars.

4. Risks with Accomplice Evidence:

• Accomplices might include false information to implicate innocents.
• Independent evidence is crucial to guard against wrongful convictions.

Decision

The Privy Council found the following:

1. The evidence against Bhuboni Sahu, based on the approver’s testimony and Trinath’s retracted confession, was insufficient.
2. The approver and Trinath could have colluded to implicate others falsely.
3. Conviction of Bhuboni Sahu was deemed unsafe due to the lack of corroborative evidence.
4. The conviction by the High Court was set aside, and Bhuboni Sahu was acquitted.

Conclusion

The Bhuboni Sahu v. The King case underscores the need for independent corroboration when relying on accomplice or co-accused testimonies. The Privy Council’s decision emphasizes prudence and caution in evaluating such evidence to prevent miscarriages of justice. This case continues to serve as a critical reference in the judicial assessment of evidence in criminal proceedings.

Question: What are the key points and the decision in the case of Haroon Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra?

Answer:

Introduction

The case of Haroon Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra is a significant judgment involving the interpretation of sections related to accomplice testimony and confessions in the Indian Evidence Act (IEA). This Supreme Court case elucidates the legal standing of retracted confessions and accomplice evidence.

Main Body

Facts of the Case

— Incident: The case involves the smuggling of gold from the Persian Gulf to India on August 13, 1961.

• Gold was transshipped from steam launches to Indian boats at sea and then brought to the shores.

— Arrest: A raid on the night of August 13, 1961, led to the arrest of several smugglers.

— Notice and Statements:

• On August 14, 1961, the Customs Authorities issued notices to the suspects under Section 171A of the Sea Customs Act.
• On August 15, 1961, statements were recorded from two suspects, Kashinath and Bengali.

Key Figures

• Kashinath: Made a statement implicating himself and Haroon Haji Abdulla.
• Bengali: Confessed to his own guilt and implicated Haroon in the smuggling. He later retracted his confession.
• Haroon (Appellant): Was served with a notice but was reluctant to make a statement until reviewing others’ statements.

Judicial Proceedings

1. Trial Court: Convicted Haroon and some others based on the evidence, including the statements of Kashinath and Bengali.
2. High Court: Upheld the conviction of Haroon, relying on:

• Kashinath’s testimony corroborated by his statement to Customs authorities.
• Bengali’s retracted confession.

Supreme Court: Haroon appealed, challenging the validity of the evidence used for his conviction.

Contentions of the Appellant

• Kashinath, being an accomplice, required corroboration for his evidence.
• Statements by Kashinath to Customs authorities and Bengali’s retracted confession should not serve as corroboration.

Supreme Court Observations

1. Reliability of Kashinath’s Statement:

• Kashinath’s statement was supported by Bengali’s confession, even though it was retracted.

2. Sections 114 Illustration (b) and 133 of the IEA:

• Section 133: Accomplice testimony is legally sufficient for conviction without corroboration, but it is unsafe to rely solely on it.
• Section 114 Illustration (b): Courts typically presume accomplice testimony to be unreliable unless corroborated by material particulars.
• Rule of Prudence: Insisting on corroboration of accomplice testimony in material respects to prevent false implications by accomplices.

3. Retracted Confession (Section 30):

• A retracted confession is weak evidence, more so against a co-accused.
• Such confessions are not substantive evidence but can serve as corroborative evidence.

Conclusion

• The Supreme Court found sufficient corroboration of Kashinath’s evidence against Haroon through Bengali’s confession, given independently and under conditions that ruled out collusion.
• The appeal was dismissed, and Haroon’s conviction was upheld.

Conclusion

The Haroon Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra case reinforces the principles governing the use of accomplice testimony and retracted confessions in criminal trials. The Supreme Court’s decision emphasizes the need for corroboration in accomplice testimony and clarifies the limited evidentiary value of retracted confessions, thus providing a nuanced understanding of sections 114, 133, and 30 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Question: What are the key points and the decision in the case of Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana?

Answer:

Introduction

The case of Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana is a landmark judgment that deals with the corroboration of accomplice testimony and the application of issue estoppel in criminal law. This Supreme Court decision, rendered on February 7, 1975, by Hon’ble Justice Goswami, provides insights into the legal standards for evidence and the reliability of accomplice testimony.

Main Body

Facts of the Case

• Ravinder Singh (Husband): Employed in the Air Force Department at Sirsa.
• Bimla (Wife): Refused to divorce Ravinder, who threatened to kill her.
• Balbir Kaur (Girlfriend): Ravinder was pretending to be unmarried to her.
• Jasbir Inder Singh (Approver): A friend of Ravinder who became an approver in the case.
• Bhanu Prakash (Cousin of Ravinder): Advised using acid to expedite Bimla’s death.
• Satinder Kumar (Brother of Ravinder): Participated in the crime.

Timeline of Events:

• July 30, 1969: Ravinder, Bimla, Satinder, Jasbir, and Bhanu Prakash traveled to Sirsa.
• July 31, 1968: Around 2:15 A.M., grievous hurt was inflicted on Bimla in a train compartment.
• Later on July 31, 1968: Bimla was found in a semi-conscious state and later died in the hospital.
• August 2, 1968: The accused resumed their duties at the Air Force Station.
• August 13, 1968: Arrest of the accused.

Manner of Commission of Murder:

• Ravinder threw Bimla on the floor of the train compartment.
• Jasbir held her by the feet.
• Bhanu Prakash poured acid into her mouth.
• Bimla’s jewelry was removed, and she was thrown out of the running train.
• Acid burns were found on the hands of Ravinder and Bhanu Prakash.

Judicial Proceedings

1. Trial Court: Acquitted Ravinder.
2. High Court: Convicted Ravinder under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
3. Supreme Court: Ravinder appealed the conviction.

Supreme Court Observations

Corroboration of Accomplice Testimony:

— The Supreme Court found corroboration for the approver’s evidence from various sources, including Ravinder seeking medical attention for acid burns.

— Approver’s Credibility:

• An approver is typically unreliable but can be credible if the story involves the approver in the crime and aligns with natural events.
• The approver’s testimony should implicate the accused conclusively.

— Conviction without Corroboration:

• In rare cases, conviction based solely on an approver’s uncorroborated evidence can be permissible if the court finds the testimony true and reliable.

— Conviction with Corroboration:

• Material corroboration is generally required due to the inherent unreliability of an approver seeking immunity.

Issue Estoppel:

• The rule of issue estoppel does not apply as the parties and facts in the trials of Ravinder Singh and Bhanu Prakash Singh were not identical.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court upheld Ravinder Singh’s conviction, emphasizing the importance of corroboration in accomplice testimony and clarifying the non-applicability of issue estoppel in this context. This case underscores the rigorous standards for evaluating evidence and the reliability of testimony from individuals involved in the crime.

Question: What are the key points and the decision in the case of Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra?

Answer:

Introduction

The case of Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra is a pivotal Supreme Court decision that clarifies the relationship between Section 133 and illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Decided on April 19, 1977, this case underscores the judicial approach to handling accomplice testimony and the necessity of corroboration in criminal proceedings.

Main Body

Facts of the Case

• The case revolves around the conviction of the accused based on the testimony of an accomplice.
• The primary legal issue pertains to the interpretation and application of Section 133 of the Evidence Act, which allows for the conviction of an accused based on the testimony of an accomplice, and illustration (b) to Section 114, which suggests that an accomplice’s testimony should be corroborated by material particulars.

Legal Analysis

Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act:

• Section 133: States that an accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person and that a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
• Illustration (b) to Section 114: Allows the court to presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars.

Harmonizing Section 133 and Illustration (b):

• There is no inherent conflict between Section 133 and illustration (b) to Section 114. The illustration merely suggests that the court “may” presume an accomplice to be unreliable unless corroborated, not that such a presumption is mandatory or irrebuttable.
• The practical implication is that while a court can legally convict based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, it is prudent and often necessary to seek corroboration to ensure the reliability of the evidence.

Judicial Prudence and the Rule of Corroboration:

• Convicting an accused based on the testimony of an accomplice without corroboration is considered hazardous due to the inherent risk of relying on a self-confessed criminal.
• Judicial experience has elevated the prudential rule of seeking corroboration into a requirement of law, emphasizing that while it is not illegal to convict on uncorroborated testimony, the rule of corroboration should be present in the judge’s mind.
• Corroboration may be dispensed with only if the peculiar circumstances of a case make it safe to do so.

Conclusion

In Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of corroborating accomplice testimony to safeguard against the risks of convicting based on potentially unreliable evidence. The court highlighted that while a conviction on uncorroborated testimony is not illegal, it is generally prudent to seek corroboration, ensuring that the evidence is credible and reliable. This case reinforces the balance between legal provisions and judicial prudence in criminal law.