Who Is a 'Workman' Under Indian Labour Law? The Test, the Exclusions, and the Edge Cases

The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does not protect all persons who work for an employer. It protects “workmen.” Whether a particular person qualifies as a workman determines whether they can raise an industrial dispute, claim retrenchment compensation under Section 25F, receive protection against arbitrary dismissal, and access the entire adjudication machinery of the Act. The Act’s coverage is therefore shaped not only by whether the employer runs an “industry” — the question examined in the previous article on the Bangalore Water Supply test — but also by whether the worker is a “workman” within the statutory definition.¹

That second definitional gate excludes a significant portion of the Indian workforce. Managers, supervisors earning above the statutory threshold, and independent contractors are all potentially outside the definition. So too — in contested case law — are persons who perform work characterised as managerial or administrative even if their formal designation says nothing of the kind. And so are persons engaged under a contract for services rather than a contract of service, which is the central distinction the courts have had to apply across an enormous variety of fact patterns, from salt-pan workers in Saurashtra to pharmaceutical representatives across India to officers of nationalised banks.

The definition of “workman” is therefore one of the most litigated provisions in the statute. This article examines the statutory text, the contract of service versus contract for service distinction, the exclusions the statute creates, the primary-function test for persons with mixed duties, the specific case law that has shaped the doctrine, the persistent problem of contract labour, and the position under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020.

I. Section 2(s) — The Statutory Text

Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines “workman” as any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical, or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment are express or implied, and includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged, or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge, or retrenchment has led to that dispute.¹

The definition then provides three categories of exclusion: any person employed in the army, navy, air force, or in the police service; any person employed in a managerial or administrative capacity; and any person employed in a supervisory capacity who draws wages exceeding a prescribed amount per mensem, or exercises functions mainly of a managerial nature.

The positive definition is deliberately wide, capturing nearly the full breadth of the industrial workforce. The negative definition — with its three exclusions — is where most of the litigation concentrates, because the boundary lines are factual rather than formal. They require courts to dissect job roles, wage slips, and contractual arrangements in granular detail across every sector of the economy.

II. The Positive Definition — Who Is Included

The positive definition covers persons employed to do any of seven categories of work.

Manual work covers physical work with the hands — loading, unloading, construction, maintenance, cleaning.

Unskilled work is work requiring no particular training or expertise — casual labour, helper categories.

Skilled work requires specific training or qualification — electricians, mechanics, technicians, craftspersons.

Technical work applies technical knowledge or expertise — engineers, draughtsmen, laboratory technicians.

Operational work is directly concerned with the operation of an enterprise — machine operators, drivers.

Clerical work is office-based work — typists, data entry operators, account clerks, administrative assistants below the managerial level.

Supervisory work involves oversight and direction of other workers — foremen, supervisors, team leaders — but is subject to the wage and function tests in the negative definition.

The word “employed” has been interpreted to require a contract of employment, whether express or implied. This imports the foundational distinction between contract of service and contract for service. The phrase “for hire or reward” requires remuneration, in cash or kind. Purely voluntary workers are outside the definition.

“Whether the terms are express or implied” is critical in the Indian context. The absence of a formal written contract does not by itself exclude a person. Where the facts show that a person regularly worked under the employer’s direction and control for remuneration, an implied contract of service may arise. This anti-formalism principle is particularly relevant in small establishments, seasonal industries, and family-run enterprises where oral understandings govern the relationship and written documentation is sparse or absent.

III. The Real Dividing Line: Contract of Service and Contract for Service

The most basic inquiry is whether the relationship is one of contract of service or contract for service. A contract of service is employment in the true sense — the worker is part of the employer’s organisational structure, works under the employer’s control, and is integrated into the enterprise. A contract for services is an independent arrangement — the contractor undertakes to deliver a result, but does so with a degree of independence incompatible with ordinary employment. Only persons under a contract of service qualify as workmen.

The classical test is the control test: does the employer have the right not only to tell the person what to do, but also how, when, and where to do it? If the employer exercises that comprehensive direction, the relationship tends toward employment. If the person is free to determine method, timing, and means, and the employer cares only about the result, the relationship tends toward independent contracting.

The Supreme Court in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra (AIR 1957 SC 264) applied this test to salt-pan workers employed on a seasonal basis. The workers argued they were employed under contracts of service; the employer argued they were independent contractors. The Court treated the issue as whether the employer exercised control in a manner consistent with employment and held that the salt-pan workers were workmen, establishing the control test as the primary analytical tool.²

Courts have recognised, however, that the control test alone is not always sufficient in complex modern employment arrangements. Three supplementary tests have developed. The integration test asks whether the worker’s work is integrated into the employer’s business or merely attached to it. A permanent employee is integrated; a contractor brought in for a specific project is typically not. The Supreme Court in Silver Jubilee Tailoring House v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments (1974) 3 SCC 498 moved toward a broader analysis and held that the old control test, by itself, is insufficient in modern working arrangements; the court must look at the totality of circumstances.³

The economic-reality test examines who bears the economic risk. A worker who bears no capital risk, who depends on a single employer for a livelihood, and whose work schedule is determined by the employer is more likely an employee than an independent contractor, regardless of what the contract labels them. The dominant-impression test looks at the entirety of the relationship — terms, practical arrangements, mutual intentions, economic context — and asks whether the relationship carries the dominant impression of employment or independent contracting.

The courts have been willing to look behind the formal contractual label where substance diverges from form. An employer cannot avoid the Act’s protections by labelling a de facto employee as a “contractor” if the practical realities of the relationship are those of employment. This anti-evasion principle is robust — it runs through the entire jurisprudence and reflects the legislative philosophy that protective legislation should not be defeated by clever drafting.

IV. Why Courts Look Beyond Labels

The modern labour court does not stop at the name printed on the appointment letter. This is not because contractual labels are irrelevant in all law. It is because, in the employment context, labels can be manipulated. An employer can call a person “consultant,” “associate,” “coordinator,” or “executive,” yet still control the person like an ordinary employee. Labour adjudication looks at the real relationship, not merely the vocabulary used to describe it.

The Supreme Court in Hussainbhai, Calicut v. Alath Factory Thozhilali Union (1978) 4 SCC 257 took a strongly substance-oriented approach, treating an intermediary contractor as potentially irrelevant where the real economic control remained with the principal employer.⁴ The Court emphasised that labour law must see through formal arrangements that conceal the true employer-employee relationship. If the work is really for the business of another, and that party controls the worker’s livelihood, the court may lift the veil.

This principle applies equally to the contract labour problem discussed separately below. An employer cannot escape the Act’s consequences by outsourcing to a nominal contractor with no independent commercial reality.

V. The Supervisory Exclusion — The Wage Limb and the Function Limb

The statute excludes from “workman” any person employed in a supervisory capacity who draws wages exceeding the prescribed ceiling per mensem, or who exercises functions mainly of a managerial nature. These are two independent limbs — either suffices for exclusion.

The wage limb: a person in a supervisory capacity drawing wages above the prescribed ceiling is excluded. The ceiling has been revised over time. Under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, the threshold is eighteen thousand rupees per mensem, subject to future notification by the Central Government. Persons in supervisory roles earning above this ceiling are not workers under the Code. The legislative rationale is that higher-earning supervisors are more aligned with management in their economic interests and in the power asymmetry of the employment relationship — they are, in the Kahn-Freund framework, closer to the “bearer of power” than to the “person not a bearer of power.”

The function limb: a person in a supervisory capacity who exercises functions mainly of a managerial nature is excluded regardless of wages. The key word is “mainly.” If the dominant function is managerial — making decisions, allocating resources, hiring and firing, exercising authority over others on behalf of the employer — the supervisory designation does not bring the person within the Act’s protection.

This is the primary-function test. It requires a factual assessment of what the person actually does, not what their designation says. A person titled “supervisor” who in practice does manual or clerical work and has no genuine managerial authority may still be a workman. A person titled “assistant manager” who in practice does primarily routine clerical work may also be a workman. A person titled “team leader” who genuinely directs others, recommends disciplinary action, and exercises economic authority over the workforce may be excluded even at a moderate wage.

The courts have consistently held that the primary-function analysis must examine the substance of the role. In May and Baker (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen (AIR 1967 SC 678), the Supreme Court applied this approach and confirmed that designation is not conclusive — what matters is the actual nature of the duties performed.⁵ A later decision in S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra (1983) 4 SCC 214 refined the function test further, excluding supervisors whose actual duties included sanctioning leave and imposing penalties as “mainly managerial.”⁶ The continuing relevance of May and Baker over S.K. Verma on the preference for the primary-function framework has been recognised in subsequent Supreme Court authority.

VI. The Managerial and Administrative Exclusion

The statutory definition also excludes persons employed in a managerial or administrative capacity. This exclusion is distinct from the supervisory exclusion and carries no wage ceiling — a person genuinely employed in managerial or administrative work is excluded regardless of their earnings.

The distinction between management and supervision is one of substance. A genuine manager makes decisions that affect the enterprise: formulating policy, allocating budgets, hiring and firing, representing the employer externally. An administrator manages internal processes — HR compliance, records, procurement systems. Neither is a workman.

But designation remains irrelevant. Courts have repeatedly found that persons formally designated as “managers” or “executives” are in fact workmen where their duties are primarily clerical or operational and they exercise no real managerial authority. The primary-function test applies here with equal force as to the supervisory exclusion.

The rationale for the exclusion is rooted in the Act’s purpose — which is the Kahn-Freund insight applied in reverse. The Act protects workers against the economic power of employers. Genuine managers exercise that economic power on behalf of the employer. Including them within the Act’s protective framework would conflate the parties whose asymmetric relationship the Act exists to address. The exclusion maintains the conceptual integrity of collective bargaining and industrial adjudication.

VII. The Primary-Function Test Across Occupations — Case Law

The primary-function test has been applied across a wide range of occupations, producing a body of fact-specific precedent that is essential for any practitioner or student in this area.

In the banking sector, the Supreme Court has examined in multiple cases whether officers of commercial banks perform primarily supervisory functions of a managerial nature. Officers who primarily processed files and supervised clerical staff mechanically, without exercising genuine economic authority — no loan sanctions, no credit decisions — were held to be workmen. Officers who sanctioned advances, made credit assessments, or exercised genuine authority over the bank’s business operations were excluded.

Medical representatives employed to promote pharmaceutical products to doctors generated substantial litigation. Routine product promotion and reporting to a supervisor supported workman status; territory management and independent target-setting tilted toward exclusion. The IRC 2020 has now expressly included “sales promotion employees” in the definition of worker, reducing — though not eliminating — the scope for these disputes going forward.

Engineers and technicians performing primarily technical functions — design, testing, maintenance, calibration — have generally been held to be workmen even where their earnings substantially exceed ordinary worker levels. Their work falls squarely within the “technical” category in the positive definition, and the supervisory exclusion does not apply unless genuine managerial authority is also exercised.

Journalists and editorial staff present a recurring category. Sub-editors, reporters, and photographers performing skilled journalistic work have been held to be workmen. Senior editors exercising editorial authority and directing the work of the editorial team have been excluded on managerial grounds. The IRC 2020’s express inclusion of “working journalists” resolves the threshold question for most journalistic roles.

The common thread across all these categories is that the statutory inquiry is not nominal. It is factual, contextual, and grounded in the actual work performed.

VIII. The Inclusion of Dismissed, Discharged, or Retrenched Persons

Section 2(s) expressly includes within “workman” any person who has been dismissed, discharged, or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of an industrial dispute, or whose termination has led to that dispute. Section 2A additionally provides that an individual workman’s dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, or termination is itself an industrial dispute — without requiring sponsorship by a union or other workmen.¹

This inclusion resolves a logical circularity that would otherwise defeat the Act’s protective purpose. Without it, a dismissed worker would arguably cease to be a “workman” the moment the dismissal took effect, and could therefore not raise an industrial dispute — precisely the situation the Act was designed to address. The statutory text prevents the employer from defeating the mechanism by the simple expedient of terminating the worker before the dispute is formally raised.

The inclusion is therefore functionally essential to the Act’s operation, not merely a drafting technicality. Courts interpret it broadly — even disputes that arose before formal termination qualify if there is a causal connection between the termination and the dispute.

IX. The Definition of “Worker” Under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020

The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 came into force on 21 November 2025. The Central Government issued an Industrial Relations Code (Removal of Difficulties) Order on 8 December 2025 clarifying that existing Labour Courts, Industrial Tribunals, and National Industrial Tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act would continue to function until corresponding fora under the Code are constituted.⁷ The result is a transitional landscape: the IDA framework continues to govern pending disputes, while the Code governs new matters.

The Code renames “workman” as “worker” and reformulates the definition in Section 2(zr). It retains the same positive categories — manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical, and supervisory work for hire or reward — and the same negative exclusions: armed forces and police, managerial/administrative capacity, and supervisory capacity above the wage ceiling or mainly managerial in function.⁸

Three material changes from the old Section 2(s) deserve attention.

First, working journalists and sales promotion employees are expressly included. These categories were previously governed by separate legislation (the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 and the Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976). Their express inclusion in the Code consolidates the framework and removes the threshold disputes that previously required litigating inclusion of these categories under the IDA.

Second, the wage ceiling for the supervisory exclusion is fixed at eighteen thousand rupees per mensem. This is higher than the effective ceiling under the old notifications, meaning more supervisory-level workers now fall within the Code’s protective scope. The ceiling is subject to upward revision by Central Government notification.

Third — and this is the most important textual change — apprentices are expressly excluded from the definition of worker under the Code. The old Section 2(s) expressly included apprentices in the definition of workman. The Code reverses this: Section 2(zr) excludes apprentices as defined under the Apprentices Act, 1961. A student-trainee engaged under a formal apprenticeship under the Apprentices Act is therefore not a “worker” for the purposes of the Code. This is a deliberate policy choice to exclude structured training relationships from the dispute-resolution framework and must not be overlooked in any analysis that spans the pre-Code and post-Code periods.

The contract-of-service versus contract-for-services distinction, and the primary-function test, continue to operate under the Code’s definition without change. The fundamental analytical framework from the IDA case law remains applicable — the transition is one of vocabulary and some boundary rules, not of principle.

X. Contract Labour and the Real-Employer Inquiry

A persistent category of litigation concerns the status of contract labour. An employer who engages workers through a contractor can argue that those workers are employed by the contractor, not by the principal employer, and therefore are not “workmen” of the principal employer for any purpose under the Act.

The courts have developed a substantial body of doctrine to address this. The key analysis from Hussainbhai is that where the contractor arrangement is a sham — where the contractor has no independent commercial existence, where the workers function under the direct control and supervision of the principal employer, and where the contractor is merely a conduit for disguised direct employment — the courts look through the contractual form and treat the workers as employed by the principal employer.⁴

The factors examined include: who controls the work day-to-day; who determines the work schedule; who supplies the equipment and materials; who fixes the wage rate; whether the contractor has any genuine independent business; and whether the contract workers perform the same work alongside directly employed workers of the principal employer. All these factors point toward the real answer — which is not what the paperwork says but who actually stands in the employment relationship.

The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 addresses contract labour in a separate statutory scheme.⁹ But the workman-status question under Section 2(s) — and the Code’s equivalent — can arise independently of that Act’s abolition provisions. Principal employers cannot avoid Section 25F retrenchment obligations or the Act’s protective machinery simply by routing employment through nominal contractors.

XI. Exam Architecture

For a twenty-mark question such as “Who is a ‘workman’ under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? Discuss the relevant provisions and case law,” the answer should be structured as follows.

Open with the observation that Section 2(s) is the second definitional gateway to the Act — after “industry” under Section 2(j), the question is whether the person is a “workman.” Why it matters: access to the entire protective machinery of the Act.

Then cover the positive definition — all seven categories of work. Emphasise that “employed” requires a contract of service, and that the express/implied terms rule means absence of a written contract is not fatal. Include the provision for dismissed, discharged, and retrenched persons and its anti-circularity purpose.

Then the central distinction: contract of service versus contract for service. The control test as the primary tool. The integration test, economic-reality test, and dominant-impression test as supplementary. Why formal labels are not conclusive and how courts pierce the form — Dharangadhara Chemical Works and Silver Jubilee Tailoring House.

Then the supervisory exclusion — two independent limbs. The wage ceiling (IDA prescribed amount; IRC 2020 at Rs. 18,000). The function limb — “exercises functions mainly of a managerial nature.” The primary-function test from May and Baker. Designation is not conclusive. Illustrations: bank officers, medical representatives, journalists.

Then the managerial and administrative exclusion — no wage ceiling; the question is whether genuine managerial authority is exercised. Primary-function test again.

Close with the “worker” definition under IRC 2020 — express inclusion of working journalists and sales promotion employees; wage ceiling at Rs. 18,000; apprentices now expressly excluded. Continuity of the primary-function framework.

The author is a law student at Law Centre-1, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. Views are personal.